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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Background 
       No one would dispute that credit card use has become an important part of 
household finance.  Credit, in general, allows for transactions over time, making it 
possible for consumers to borrow against their future incomes. Credit cards are the 
most popular source of consumer credit.  Credit cards serve two distinct functions for 
consumers: a means of payment and a source of credit (Canner and Luckett, 1992).   
Credit cards provide a safe, secure, and convenient alternative to cash and checks, 
reducing the cost and the risk of payment, explaining the growing popularity of credit 
cards among the elderly (Zywicki, 2000).  On the other hand, Consumers resort to credit 
cards in order to smooth their consumption when their incomes fluctuate.  Hence, credit 
cards give their users the flexibility of revolving some or all of their debt. 
        While credit card usage constitutes a relatively new phenomenon, it became 
widespread in 1990s.  Not only did more consumers start using credit cards, but also 
they started carrying more balances forward and paying both high explicit and implicit 
interest charges on their outstanding balances.  Moreover, invoking a credit card 
revolving credit option has led to personal financial problems, such as personal 
bankruptcies and bad credit histories, making it difficult and expensive for a person to 
take a loan later. While borrowing money on a credit card is expensive, approximately 
half of credit card holders in the United States regularly carry unpaid debt, incurring 
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interest charges and some other fees not only on existing balances, but also on any 
new charges made on the card as well. 
       Even though all of the largest issuers have lowered interest rates on many of their 
accounts below the high rates maintained during the 1980s and 1990s, the interest rate 
on credit card plans averaged 14.68 percent in 2007 (FRB, 2008).  On the other hand, 
credit card interest rates are higher than other consumer credit interest rates.   
Nevertheless, the holding and use of general-purpose credit cards with a revolving 
feature have increased substantially over the last decade.  Furthermore, the revolving 
credit component of total household debt has increased faster than household 
disposable income, making both policy makers and the banking community pays more 
attention to the credit card market (Ekici, 2006).  Real revolving consumer credit grew 
about 1600 percent from 1969 to 1989 (Duca and Whitesell, 1995). 
       Surprisingly enough, the size of the total consumer revolving and non-revolving 
debt rose five times in size from 1980 ($355 billion) to 2001 ($1.7 trillion) to almost $2.6 
trillion in 2008 (FRB, 2008).  The total U.S. consumer revolving debt amounted to 
$963.5 billion in December 2008 of which 98% was credit card debt (FRB, 2009).  
According to the Consumer Finance Monthly (CFM) of The Ohio State University, the 
average credit card balances for those carrying a balance rose from $7,362 in 2006 to 
$9,336 in 2009 (CFM, 2009). 
       According to the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances, balances on bank cards 
accounted for 87.1 percent of outstanding credit card balances in 2007, up from 84.9 
percent  in 2004 (FRB, 2009).  Approximately 73.0 percent of the U.S. families surveyed 
in 2007 had credit cards, compared to 46.0 percent in the early 1990’s (FRB, 2009). On 
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the other hand, average and median credit card balances both rose from 2004 to 2007.  
The average balance for those carrying a balance rose from around $5,100 in 2004 
(2004 dollars) to $7,300 (2007 dollars) in 2007.  That is almost a 30.0 percent increase 
from 2004’s average balance.  The median balance for those carrying credit card 
balances rose to $3,000 in 2007 from $2,200 in 2004, almost a 25.0 percent increase 
(FRB, 2009).1  The noticeable difference between median and average debt is due to 
some credit card holders carrying very large amounts of debt which skewed the 
average.   
       The latest projections in the credit card industry estimate that there were 159 million 
credit cardholders in the United States in 2000, 173 million in 2006, and the number is 
projected to grow to 181 million Americans by 2010 (Nilson Report, 2008).   According 
to the 2004 Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finances statistics, approximately 
74.9 percent of the U.S. families surveyed in 2004 had credit cards, and 58 percent of 
those families carried a balance (FRB, 2006).   
       According to 2007 Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finances statistics, of the 
73.0 percent of the U.S. families surveyed in 2007 who had credit cards, 60 percent had 
a balance at the time of the interview (FRB, 2009).  These so–called “revolvers” exhibit 
payment behavior that differs from those who repay their entire credit card balance 
every month.   As of the end of 2007, consumers carried a total of about $951.7 billion 
dollars in outstanding balances on all their revolving accounts (FRB, 2008).   
 
 
_________________________________ 
¹ The Survey of Consumer Finances is a survey of U.S. household sponsored by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System.  It is conducted every three years, and the data are collected by the National Research Center at the University of Chicago. 
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1.2. Purpose of the Study  
       The purpose of this study is to use monthly random telephone survey data on the 
household level of credit card usage to identify and estimate the underlying 
determinants and various factors that influence consumers’ credit card switching 
behavior.  In the credit card industry, some critical questions remain unanswered about 
what influences a consumer decisions whether to switch or not to switch credit card 
balances (Ekici, 2006).  Because there are many firms in the credit card market, 
competition is supposed to be intense.  However, the industry deviates from being 
perfectly competitive, because the industry fails to offer consumers the benefits 
resulting from a perfectly competitive market, such as low prices (low interest rates), 
teaser rates (sweeteners) for consumers to switch, and other incentives and perks 
associated with credit cards.  Consumer-level data consistently show that many 
consumers carry balances on their credit cards with fairly high interest rates even 
though they receive offers from cards with lower rates (Stango, 2002).  An econometric 
model and an empirical estimation procedure will be used to predict consumer behavior 
in the credit card market and to examine whether consumers switch cards (balances) 
when they are offered to do so.  Using recent consumer finance data, this research 
empirically tests the effects of a variety of variables including some economic, 
demographic and attitude variables, such as income, interest rates, outstanding 
balances, employment, and other demographic variables significance in influencing 
consumer decisions whether to switch or not to switch cards.  The existence of 
consumer switching costs in this industry will be discussed as well.                 
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1.4. Organization of the Dissertation  
       The organization of this dissertation is as follows.  Chapter 1 provides background 
material for the study, discuses the significance of the study, and outlines the 
organization of the discussion.  This chapter also provides the purpose of the study.  
Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature and outlines the theoretical background.  
Chapter 3 presents a simple version of Klemperer’s two–period duopoly model of firms’ 
competition applied to the credit card industry.  Chapter 4 describes the data source 
along with descriptive statistics.  It also describes the econometric methods to be used 
and a number of econometric issues.  Chapter 5 presents the estimation methodology 
and empirical results.  Chapter 6 summarizes the key findings, the implications of the 
study, and presents some suggestions for future research. 
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                                                  CHAPTER  
                                                   LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1. Overview of Literature      
       Despite the fact that the first credit cards were issued approximately 50 years ago, 
research into their usage has been relatively new.  The bulk of early research on credit 
card usage centered on explaining the stickiness of interest rates in the credit card 
industry and effects of search on interest rates prevalent in the 1980s.  Early research 
has attributed the rate stickiness in the credit card industry to the failure of interest rate 
competition due to the following three sources: switching and search costs, adverse 
selection, and consumer irrationality.  
       The first attempt to explore this industry was pioneered by Ausubel (1991). Ausubel  
noticed that although there were about 4,000 banks in the US credit card market, the 
industry was far from being competitive because of high and sticky interest rates during  
1980s.  He uncovers abnormal returns by firms in this industry.  He argues that despite 
considerable variation in the underlying cost of funds, credit cards interest rates 
remained sticky and high during 1980’s.  Ausubel argues that from 1982 to1989, the 
cost of funds rate fluctuated between 6-15 percent and then declined from 15 percent to 
10 percent at the end of this period.  Despite this significant reduction in the cost of 
funds, credit card interest rates remained constantly high at almost 18 percent in the 
same period.  Hence, the credit card industry deviates from being perfectly competitive.  
Ausubel attributes the failure of competition in the credit card industry to the following 
reasons: switching and search costs, adverse selection, and consumers’ irrationality.  
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According to Ausubel’s theory, consumers underestimate their borrowing potential 
because they expect to use the cards for convenience, not as a source of credit.  
Therefore, they accrue outstanding balances and pay unnecessary high interest rates 
on those unanticipated balances.   
       In his study, Ausubel categorized borrowers into two groups: low–risk borrowers 
and high–risk borrowers.  Low–risk borrowers underestimate their borrowing potential 
and are less sensitive (responsive) to the interest rates because they do not intend to 
borrow in the first place but they end up doing so.  High–risk borrowers are interest–
responsive and fully intend to borrow.  Thus, if a bank unilaterally lowers its interest 
rate, it will primarily attract the interest sensitive customers whom a bank does not wish 
to attract.  Those customers represent high–risk borrowers.  Therefore, when a single 
bank reduces its credit card rate, it worsens its pool of customers.  Ausubel argues that 
this behavior is compounded by the presence of high switching and search costs.  In the 
presence of this adverse selection problem, credit card issuers face a pool of 
consumers who differ in their risk degrees.   However, good debtors will be overcharged 
and bad debtors will pay less than what they should, resulting in driving out good 
debtors from the market.  Therefore, card issuers would be discouraged from competing 
on interest rates. This fear of adverse selection problem encourages card issuers to 
keep the card rates high and therefore make extraordinary profits.  Ausubel provides an 
additional explanation for the industry failure which is consumers’ irrationality.  
Consumers borrow on their credit cards without realizing that they will not be able to pay 
their balances in full.    
       Pozdena (1991) provides an alternate market-based explanation for insensitivity of 
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credit card interest rates to changes in the market rates.  Pozdena argues that the 
majority of credit card holders are convenience users who routinely pay off their 
balances in full each month without revolving balances from one billing period to 
another.  Credit card convenience users do not search for lower rates, but they will be 
primarily sensitive to annual fees and grace periods, an implication that is consistent 
with Ausubel’s theory.  This will dissuade cards issuers from lowering their card rates.  
On the other hand, households resort to borrow at high card interest rates when their 
financial condition is relatively weak (moral hazard of lending).  Because credit card 
debt is poorly collateralized and costly to service, bank credit card interest rates are 
sticky (sluggish) and are not responsive to changes in other market rates.    
       Canner and Luckett (1992) employ information theory to explain that consumer 
insensitivity to bank card interest rates may be rational if credit cards are used for 
transaction convenience, rather than for carrying balances.  Convenience users do not 
gain much from searching for lower rates. Therefore, they are rationally insensitive to 
the interest rate.  Hence, credit cards’ convenience and service quality become more 
important than the cost of the funds.  Canner and Luckett suggest another reason that 
consumers might be relatively insensitive to interest rates.  Some credit card holders 
who carry high levels of balances from one month to month may be willing to switch 
their balances to other cards that offer lower rates.  High levels of balances make these 
consumers less attractive high-risk consumers to issuers offering lower rates, inducing 
card issuers to keep their interest rates high.  This argument is consistent with Calem 
and Mester (1995), discussed below.   
       Mester (1994) provides different explanations for high and sticky interest rates on 
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credit cards by focusing on the non-collateralized features of credit card debt.  Mester 
recognizes that imperfect information about cardholders’ risk is the reason behind the 
high rates in this industry.  Because low–risk borrowers who have access to low interest 
collateralized loans leave the credit card market, card holders are charged high interest 
rates on the average.  If a bank unilaterally lowers its interest rate, it will attract less 
profitable high–risk borrowers.  Mester concludes that credit card rates do not fall one 
by one when the cost of funds to banks goes down because the demand for credit 
cards, in turn, may be influenced by the level of the real interest rate in the financial 
markets.   
       Calem & Mester (1995) support Ausubel’s theory that the credit card industry 
deviates from a perfectly competitive model because consumers do not conform to the 
behavioral assumptions of perfect competition, due to the existence of search and 
switching costs, and due to the likelihood of facing an adverse selection problem by 
firms who reduce their interest rates unilaterally.  They find that the level of credit card 
debt is greater among consumers who do not search for lower rates.  On the other 
hand, the authors find that consumers with high balances are discouraged from 
searching because of their greater likelihood of rejection.  The authors argue that fear of 
being denied credit makes the consumers stick to their credit card that has high interest 
rate.  However, the authors find no evidence that consumers underestimate their 
borrowing potential, which was found by Ausubel’s early research.  Calem and Mester 
attribute the industry interest rate competition failure to consumers’ lack of search for 
lower card rates.   Using data from the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to 
investigate “whether adverse selection problem arises because borrowers face 
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switching and search costs or because they are reluctant to search and switch because 
they believe their borrowing will be short–lived,” Calem and Mester find there is a 
positive relationship between switching and search costs and high balances.  The 
higher is the credit card balances are, the higher is the probability of being denied 
credit.  This will discourage high-balance consumers from search and any price cut will 
attract low-balance consumers who are not profitable to card issuers. Therefore, 
consumers with high balances will search and switch less, because of their fear of being 
denied credit due to high balances.  These consumers will, therefore, stick to their 
current high-interest rate credit cards.   
       These finding are consistent with Sharp (1990), who argues that because of an 
information asymmetry problem in the credit card market, if a high quality borrower tries 
to switch to a competing (uninformed) bank, he may be pooled with low quality 
borrowers, inducing card issuers to charge high interest rates.  Therefore, card holders 
are reluctant to switch cards when they are offered to do so.  These findings confirm 
bankers’ arguments that credit card rates are sticky because consumers are not 
responsive to rate cuts and do not switch cards when they are offered to do so.  
        Calem and Mester (1995) provide an additional explanation of why the credit card 
industry deviates from being perfectly competitive.  They attribute this deviation to their 
finding that desired consumers with high balances may face higher switching costs than 
less desired consumers who are revolving low balances, inducing an adverse selection 
problem in the credit card market.  Customers who have a high disutility of search and 
are highly indebted have much more difficulty switching cards than those who do not.  In 
investigating this possibility, they test whether high credit card outstanding debt will be 
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correlated with the probability of rejection and they find there is a strong correlation.  
They also find that banks were rational in rejecting those with large outstanding 
balances.  If a bank unilaterally lowers its interest rate, it will attract borrowers that 
display a high search effort for interest rates who are revolving low balances and who 
yield low profits.  Borrowers with high balances who are most desired by a bank would 
not be easily transfer balances between banks, because they are granted a lower credit 
limit by a bank other than their current bank because of information barriers due to 
asymmetric information, because their current bank has private information about their 
previous credit history.  The authors suggest that focusing on policies that reduce 
switching costs in this industry will improve the credit card market industry performance 
and will probably lead to more competitive industry.   
       Brito and Hartley (1995) provide theoretical explanations for interest rate stickiness 
based on the liquidity services offered by credit cards’ asymmetric information and 
consumer transaction costs.  They provide different explanations for the observed high 
level of card interest rates.  Their theoretical model predicts that it is rational to borrow 
on high credit card interest rates and pay interest on outstanding credit card balances 
rather than the transaction costs associated with alternative financing.  Their model 
predicts that even small costs of arranging for other costs of loans can induce 
consumers to borrow on higher interest rates.  On the other hand, the authors argue 
that “a rational consumer may also pay interest on credit card debt to avoid some of the 
costs associated with holding precautionary money balances.”  Brito and Hartley (1995) 
also show that inflexible (sticky) credit card interest rates can be consistent with a 
competitive equilibrium under which a new potential entrant earns zero profits. 
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       Cargill and Wendel (1996), using data from the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finance, 
empirically show that income negatively affects the likelihood of borrowing on credit 
cards but is positively related to the amount borrowed.  They also show that consumers 
may rationally avoid search for lower interest rates because small outstanding balances 
imply a low return to search.  Cargill and Wendel argue that there are more credit card 
convenience users than suggested by early research.  These credit card users do not 
benefit much from searching for lower interest rates; therefore, even modest search 
costs could keep the majority of these consumers from searching for lower interest 
rates.  Cargill and Wendel (1996) findings suggest “that lack of consumer shopping for 
interest rates may be an entirely rational household decision.” Cargill and Wendel’s 
(1996) study findings are consistent with Canner and Luckett’s (1992) and Pozdena’s 
(1991) findings. 
       Stavins (1996) argues that one would expect banks to drop their interest rates to 
attract customers in a competitive market. In the class of perfect competition with 
complete information, price equals marginal cost and changes in the marginal costs 
must be translated into changes in the price of the product. However, credit-card-issuing 
banks do not appear to behave in this way in the credit card industry. The industry 
interest rates have been consistently higher than other types of consumer debt 
instruments.  In her (1996) study, Stavins finds evidence of the adverse selection 
hypothesis that the level of the bank credit card rates rises with revenues generated 
from fees and finance charges.  On the other hand, Stavins rejects the hypothesis that 
the demand for credit-card loans is insensitive to the interest rate and finds that 
defaulters have higher interest rate elasticity.  Therefore, lowering interest rates may 
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attract less creditworthy consumers who are most likely to default on paying back their 
debt, dissuading some credit-card-issuing firms from lowering their interest rates.   
       Park (1997) attributes credit card rate stickiness and high profits in the industry to 
their option–value nature.  He argues that high credit card rates reflect the value of the 
cardholders’ option to borrow when they become riskier. “The option value is partly 
offset by the presence of cardholders who choose credit card loans while they are less 
risky because of high transaction costs of alternative loans.” 
       Ausubel (1999) finds evidence of adverse selection in the credit card market.  Using 
data from large-scale randomized trials in preapproved credit card solicitations, he finds 
that respondents to solicitations are substantially worse in terms of credit risk than 
nonrespondents. Moreover, he finds that solicitations offering inferior terms yield 
customer pools with worse credit risk than solicitations offering superior terms.  
Consumers who accept inferior credit card offers tend to have higher delinquency rates.  
Ausubel concludes that “inferior offer yields an inferior customer.”  
       The later research based on 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances unravels a 
change in the US credit card market.  Most of the recent credit card industry research 
shows that the industry became more competitive as credit card issuers switched to 
variable interest rates and more firms entered the industry.   
       Crook (2002) shows that credit card holders with higher balances do not search 
less than those with lower balances. Using data from the 1998 Survey of Consumer 
Finance, Crook finds that households with poor payment histories do not appear to 
search more or less than those with better payment histories.  Hence, search theory 
based on Ausubel (1991) and Calem and Mester (1995) might be less useful in 
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explaining credit card pricing in the more recent period.  However, search costs may be 
higher for those households who miss payments due to their life styles.  Crook’s (2002) 
study findings support the search theory implications that minorities search more than 
whites, that better educated households search more than the less well educated, and 
that search decreases with aging.  This major finding by Crook (2002) is not consistent 
with early research findings, especially what was obtained by Calem and Mester (1995).  
The positive effect of high balances on search activity implies that if a bank unilaterally 
lowers its interest rates it would not attract relatively high risk borrowers.   
       Kerr and Dunn (2002) find that despite their high rejection probability, consumers 
with high balances search more for better rates than consumers with low balances.  
Kerr and Dunn argue that “high rejection probabilities do not affect search propensities.” 
Therefore, high interest rate can not be explained by search costs.  Moreover, the 
authors find that credit cardholders are becoming more rational and sensitive to the 
interest rate terms of a credit card contract.  Kerr and Dunn’s (2002) study findings 
demonstrates the important role of the Truth-In-Lending Act of 1988 in lowering the cost 
of gathering information by cardholders, leading to the decline in credit card interest 
rates in recent years.            
       Min and Kim (2003) investigate the socioeconomic determinants of consumer credit 
card borrowing.  Using a two–step estimation procedure to model consumer credit card 
borrowing, they find that credit-constrained households who are likely to be denied other 
forms of credit have a higher demand for credit card borrowing. Their empirical findings 
show that the credit card interest rate is only taken into consideration when borrowers 
decide whether to borrow or not to borrow.  They find that interest rate has no significant 
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effect on the amount of borrowing, only on the borrowing decision, dissuading card 
issuers from lowering the credit card interest rates even when the cost of funds drops.   
       Knittle and Stango (2003) provide a different explanation for interest rate stickiness.  
Using data from the credit card market during the1980s to test whether a nonbinding 
price ceiling may serve as a focal tacit collusion, they find that state-level ceilings during 
the 1980s facilitated tacit collusion by credit card issuers, leading to greater-than normal 
interest stability, but that national integration of the market reduced the sustainability of 
tacit collusion by the end of 1980s.   
       Berlin and Mester (2004) find that many models of consumer search, such as 
Ausubel (1991) and Calem and Mester (1995), fail to explain recent credit card decline 
as well as pricing behavior in credit card markets.  Moreover, the authors find that a 
drop in consumer switching costs is not a good explanation for the drop in credit card 
rates in the 1990s.         
       Dey and Mummy (2005) use data from the 1998 U.S. Survey of Consumer 
Finances (SCF) to examine the association between borrower quality and the offered 
menu of credit card borrowing limits and interest rates.  Their empirical findings show 
that there is a negative relationship between the credit card limit and the interest rate.  
On the other hand, they find that an increase in the credit card interest rate will increase 
the default rate of the borrower.  Moreover, they find that the difference between actual 
borrowing and the offered credit card limit will generate an information asymmetry 
problem, making the credit card market tend to be incomplete.   
       Yang et al. (2007) provide an alternative explanation of the long debated puzzle on 
the stickiness of credit card interest rates.  They argue that consumers’ unrealistic 
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optimism about their future borrowing estimates will make them less sensitive to the 
APR and more sensitive to the annual fee. Because these customers are very 
profitable, they are offered credit cards with features such as a high APR and a low fee, 
inducing card issuers to keep their interest rates high.  On the other hand, the authors 
provide empirical support to Ausubel’s view that the rigidity of credit card interest rates 
is the product of consumer irrationality, “because they do not intend to borrow on their 
credit cards, but find themselves doing so anyway.”  
       Telyukova and Wright (2008) provide a cost-based explanation of why consumers 
maintain credit card debt and pay interest despite the associated high interest rates.  
They argue that consumers may carry high-interest credit card debt and pay high 
interest while maintaining balances in their low-interest bearing bank accounts to avoid 
the expected costs of not holding precautionary balances or transactions balances.   
 
2.2. The Nature of the Credit Card Industry  
       Credit in general is of two types: collateralized (secured) and non-collateralized 
(non–secured).  Credit cards are a non–collateralized means of credit with an interest-
free grace period.  Moreover, credit cards are noninstallment consumer debt or open– 
ended credit in which consumers do not have to reapply each time a credit transaction 
is made.  The amount owed can be repaid monthly in equal or unequal payments 
(Garman and Forgue, 2000).    
       In recent years, the use of credit cards and other forms of credit has increased 
tremendously.  In particular, credit cards have become a major instrument for financing 
purchases in the U.S.  
       Credit cards are one of many ways through which people borrow money.  Users 
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make the purchase today using their future incomes.  The credit card issuer pays for the 
transactions, but the card users have to repay the money plus any interest accrued.        
       Interest is the cost of borrowing money and is calculated as a fixed fraction of the 
total outstanding balances. Because of the uncertainty problem in this industry, the 
interest rates on the credit cards are higher than for regular credit.  
      Credit card issuers use credit bureau consumer reports and other publicly available 
information about borrowers’ creditworthiness to evaluate borrower riskiness so that 
they can alleviate some of the information asymmetry.  However, the unsecured status 
of credit card loans makes them riskier than secured consumer loans, and more difficult 
to collect if a consumer defaults.  The uneconomic nature of collecting loans in case of 
credit card loans defaults makes lending on consumer credit card a very risky credit 
operation.   
       Zywicki (2000) argues that the presence of uncertainty in the credit card industry 
provides an explanation for the stickiness of credit card interest rates and their 
indifference to changes in the cost of funds.  First, because of the problem of adverse 
selection in the industry, low-risk borrowers can’t signal reliability and credibility to 
lenders, because it is easy for high-risk borrowers to signal themselves as low-risk 
borrowers.  Therefore, it is rational for lenders to charge the highest rates assuming that 
all borrowers fall in the high-risk category.  Second, the unsecured nature of the credit 
card loans sufficiently increases the probability of consumer default with no cost-
feasible means of loan collection. These costs are assumed not to be affected by 
changes in the cost of funds.    
       Users of credit cards fall into two broad categories: convenience users (liquid) and 
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revolvers (illiquid).  The convenience users (almost 30 to 40 percent of the entire credit 
card users) are those who pay their credit cards balances off every month and thereby 
avoid finance charges.  They also view their cards simply as a transaction medium to 
substitute for cash and checks, and along with transactions, they often receive extra 
benefits from various perks programs such as cash back and frequent flier miles.   
Interest rates might not mean much to them, but if they see a lower rate on another 
card, they might still switch.   
       Revolvers are those credit card holders who view a credit card as a debt instrument 
and a source of credit.  They regularly roll over most of their outstanding balances to 
future billing periods, incurring interest charges and sometimes other fees in order to do 
so.  In addition, most revolvers jump from one card to another, taking advantage of the 
introductory “teaser” rate but then switching to yet another card when the low-interest 
introductory period ends.  
       “Teaser” rates are much lower than the prevailing interest rate for a limited period of 
time, encouraging consumers to transfer balances to the new card offering the lower 
interest rate. Apparently, a cardholder who revolves regularly is more credit constrained 
than other cardholders and wishes to utilize the credit function as a source of credit as 
opposed to other card’s attributes (Carow and Staten, 2002). 
        Liquid consumers benefit from credit cards because they are granted a grace 
period with other enhancements, such as frequent-user awards.  Most credit cards 
provide a grace period.  If payment is made in full, the consumer does not incur finance 
charges.  Illiquid consumers benefit from credit cards because they become able to 
borrow against their future incomes (Chakravorti and Ted, 1999).  Because credit card 
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convenience users use credit only for convenience, they are not very profitable to the 
credit card issuers.  However, the interest-free grace period for convenience users is 
financed by the revolvers (Chakravorti and Emmons, 2003).       
       Economic information theory predicts that revolvers are more likely to be sensitive 
to interest rates and credit card solicitations than convenience users.  On the other 
hand, convenience users are more likely to be sensitive to the amount of the annual fee 
and the length of the interest free grace period than revolvers (Canner and Luckett, 
1992).  
       In terms of consumer risk, industry researchers distinguish four types of cards 
users: (1) low-risk convenience users who use cards for convenience purpose only with 
no intention to revolve balances; (2) low-risk users who revolve balances; (3) high-risk 
users who carry balances and (4) high-risk users who do not carry balances (Kim, Dunn 
and Mumy, 2005).       
      Researchers have traditionally tried to examine the underlying determinants of 
consumer credit card borrowing despite the availability of other low-cost financing debt 
instruments.  Among many factors affecting card adoption include a fair interest rate, 
cash bonuses, no annual fee, and quality customer services.   
       Canner and Luckett (1992) argue that credit cards have become an indispensable 
source of identification and a convenient means for making reservations in hotels, plane 
tickets, and the like.  Carow and Staten (2002) find that convenience and rebates are 
the primary reasons for using a bank credit card.   Brito and Hartley (1995) argue that in 
revolving balances, a rational consumer would pay interest on outstanding card 
balances to avoid transaction costs associated with arranging other loans, while 
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minimizing the costs associated with holding precautionary money (Brito and Hartley, 
1995). 
       Sprenger and Stavins (2008), using data collected in the 2005 Survey of Consumer 
Payment Preferences, find that credit card revolvers are significantly more likely to use 
debt and less likely to use credit than convenience users who repay their balances each 
month.  They provide two reasons for the expensive credit card borrowing, the cost-
based explanation and the behavioral explanation. Under the cost-based explanation, 
consumers may view credit card borrowing to be less expensive than other borrowing 
alternatives when the take the costs associated with insufficient liquidity and alternative 
financing arrangements into consideration.  Under the behavioral reasoning, credit card 
borrowing may be attractive for those individuals who overvalue present consumption 
and undervalue future costs associated with repaying the debt, given the credit card 
usage decoupling of separating the pleasure received from consumption from the pain 
of paying for it. 
 
2.3. The Evolution of the Credit Card Market  
        In 1887, in his novel “Looking Backward,” Edward Bellamy, an American author 
and socialist, speculated about buying commodities with a card.  The introduction of the 
credit card in the mid-twentieth century revolutionized and transformed how people live.  
       Credit, in general, is as old as human society.  However, the concept of a general-
purpose credit card came to existence in 1949 when Frank McNamara dined in a New 
York restaurant and discovered he could not pay for his meal.  Later, he founded and 
named Diners Club, which would issue cards to consumers and sign merchants to 
accept those cards (Evan and Schmalensee, 1999).      
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      In 1958, the first widely accepted plastic charge card was introduced by American 
Express having the marketing tagline as “Do not Leave Home without It.”   
BankAmericard introduced the first revolving general–purpose credit card in 1959, 
which became Visa in 1977.  In 1966, the Interbank Card Association introduced 
“Master Charge” which became MasterCard in 1979.   
       To make bank cards appealing to consumers who already had department store 
cards, bank card issuers granted those consumers an interest-free “grace period” of 20-
25 days, the same grace period that was granted by department stores (Canner and 
Luckett, 1992).   
       Visa and MasterCard have been dominating the U.S. general purpose credit card 
market.  Both issuers combined accounted for an estimated 602 million cards in 2008, 
up from an estimated 599.4 million cards in 2007.  In addition, American Express and 
Discover issued an estimated of 111.1 million cards in 2008, up from an estimated 109 
million cards in 2007 (Nilson Report, 2009).      
      The credit card industry in the United States experienced high and sticky interest 
rates in 1980s.  During this period, the average credit card rate was almost 19.8 
percent, while the rate for the perfectly competitive market with zero profit was 
estimated to be around 13.2 percent (Ausubel, 1991).  In his major investigation of the 
US credit card industry, Ausubel (1991) attributed the industry deviation from being a 
perfectly competitive industry to three reasons: consumer irrationality, search costs, and 
switching costs.  
        Much has changed in the credit card industry.  In particular, the Truth-in-Lending 
Act of1988 has produced a major shake-up in the industry.  The Fair Credit and Charge  
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Card Disclosure Act of 1988 intends to improve informational efficiency in order to 
increase competition in the credit card industry.  Under the Truth-in-Lending Act, 
creditcard issuers are required to disclose all information regarding interest rate, annual 
fees,and grace  period in their solicitations, thereby forcing card issuers to report up-
front their most important contract terms (Kerr and Dunn, 2002).  Beginning in the mid-
1990s, the U.S. credit card market started to become more competitive.  Interest rates 
became more competitive and variable as price competition increased.  There was a 
wide dispersion of interest rates, ranging from zero percent introductory rates up to 
rates well above 20 percent.  Debt-carrying credit card users started to search more for 
better rates which enhanced competition in the in the industry (Kerr and Dunn, 2002).  
On the other hand, advances in technology in terms of credit security technology and 
data quality reduced the economic significance of information–based barriers to 
prescreening and solicitation of card applicants.  In addition, information innovation such 
as widespread access to the internet reduced the search and switching costs of 
customers ( Calem, Gordy and Mester, 2005).   
 
2.4. The Nature of Price Competition in the Credit Card Industry 
       The nature of Price Competition in the Credit Card Industry has been unusual.  The 
structure of the market is competitive in that the industry comprises of thousands of card 
issuers.   Nevertheless, card issuers maintain high credit card interest rates and make 
high profits.  During the 1970s through the1980s and the early 1990s, the U.S. credit 
card market interest rates remained extremely high, hitting their all-time high of an 
average of almost 18.0 percent for almost two decades from 1974-1991.  Beginning 
inthe early-1990s, credit card interest rates started to decline, becoming much more 
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responsive to changes in the cost of funds.  Thereafter, they fluctuated between 14.0 
and 16.0 percent.2 During the early 1990s, Ausubel (1991) noticed that even though 
there were many firms in the market, the industry was far from being perfectly 
competitive, because of high and sticky industry interest rates.  Ausubel also argues 
that as a result of this absence of adequate competition, credit card issuers have 
earned extraordinary profits, causing them to extend credit to risky consumers.  The 
credit card issuers attributed the high interest rates to the high default rates.   
       Stango (2000) investigates pricing and competition in the credit card market.  He 
shows that the stronger presence of variable-rate firms offering variable-rate cards 
wasassociated with more aggressive competition for new customers. He also finds 
empirical support of a positive relationship between prices and market share in the 
credit card market.   
        Stango (2002) empirically examines the relationship between pricing for 
commercial banks and switching costs.  He argues that a given credit card issuer’s price 
is an increasing function of the indebtedness of its customers, the indebtedness of its 
competitors’ customers, the annual fee charged by an issuer’s competitors, and the 
market share of an issuer in its home state. Using data from the Card Industry Directory, 
an annual publication that lists data for the largest 250 credit card Issuers over the 
period 1984-1994, Stango finds a strong relationship between switching costs of an 
issuer’s customers and credit card prices (interest rates).   
       Chacravarti and Emmons (2003) argue that card issuers, in competing to attract 
profitable customers, may offer incentives to convenience users, because some of them  
________________ 
2Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, FRB Annual Report “The Profitability of Credit Card Operations 
of Depository Institutions,” June 2001. 
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may become revolvers in the future.  Gross and Souleles (2002) attribute the increased 
competition in the credit card industry to greater consumers’ sensitivity to credit card 
interest rates. 
       The credit card industry is highly concentrated.  The top 10 credit card issuers 
controlled approximately 88 percent of the market share with $972.73 billion in general-
purpose card debt outstanding in 2008. That includes Visa, MasterCard, American 
Express, and Discover and is up from approximately 85% in 2007 (Nilson Report, 
2009).  Moreover, the industry has no barriers to entry and exit, consistent with 
contestable market theory. The Contestable Market Theory is a theoretical analysis 
focusing on perfectly free entry and exit.  The theory suggests that the special case of 
perfectly free, absolute, reversible entry is the basis for defining efficient allocation.3  
The theory rests on the following three assumptions: 
1. Entry is free and without limit.  With no costs, the new entrant can replace the 
incumbent. 
2. Entry is absolute. With a slight price difference, the entrant can displace the 
existing firm. 
3. Entry is perfectly reversible.   Firms can exit the market at no cost.  Sunk cost is   
 
zero.   
       The credit card industry is comprised of 6000 atomistic competitors that sell similar 
services to millions of customers nationwide.  Currently, there are around 10,000  
_____________________ 
3This section draws on William G. Shepherd, “Contestability versus Competition,” American Economic Review, vol. 74, pp. 572-587, 
September 1984.  The main sources on contestability are W. J. Baumol, “Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry 
structure,” American Economic Review vol. 72, pp. 1-15, March 1982.  Baumol et  
al. Contestable Markets.  
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depository institutions act as agents for credit card issuers, issuing general purpose visa 
and MasterCard credit cards to the public and distributing credit cards to consumers.  In 
addition, two large nonbank firms, American Express Co. and DiscoverFinancial 
Services, issue independent general purpose credit cards to the public.    
       Tables 1 and 2 below illustrate the holdings of credit debt by the type of financial 
Institution. 
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Table 1: Major Holders of Consumer Total Credit Outstanding Debt (Billions of Dollars) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Year                                                    2004         2005         2006           2007        2008 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Total                                                   2219.4     2313.9     2418.3        2551.9      2596.9 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Commercial Banks                            704.3          707.0        741.2        804.1        878.5 
Finance Companies                          492.3          516.5        534.4        584.1        575.8 
Credit Unions                                    215.4          228.6        234.5        235.7        235.0 
Federal Government                          86.1           89.8          91.7          98.4          111.0 
Saving Institutions                              91.3          109.1         95.5          90.8          86.3 
Nonfinancial Business                       58.6          58.8            56.8          55.2          55.6 
Pools of Securitized Assets               571.5        604.0         664.2        683.7        654.7 
4
Source FRB 
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Table 2: Major Holders of Consumer Revolving Credit Outstanding Debt (Billions of 
Dollars) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Year                                                   2004        2005         2006          2007           2008 
Revolving                                           823.7       850.0        902.3          969.6         992.3 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Commercial Banks                           314.6          311.2      327.3         353.4        390.6 
Finance Companies                          50.4            66.3        79.9           86.0          74.4 
Credit Unions                                    23.2             24.7       27.4           31.1          33.4 
Federal Government                         n.a              n.a.        n.a.             n.a.           n.a. 
Saving Institutions                             27.9            40.8        42.5           44.8          39.5 
Nonfinancial Business                       2.4             11.6         7.8             4.2            4.2 
Pools of Securitized Assets              395.2         395.4       417.5          450.0       450.2 
4
Source FRB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________ 
4Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, FRB Annual Report “The Profitability of Credit Card 
Operations of Depository Institutions,” June 2008. 
28 
2.5.  Switching Costs in the Credit Card Market  
         Switching costs refer to the hidden costs a consumer is faced with when switching 
from one producer to another in the marketplace.  Switching costs are developed by 
companies in order to establish consumers’ lock-in (Klemperer, 1987a). 
        Switching costs are incurred when consumers switch suppliers; as such ex-ante 
homogeneous products become ex-post heterogeneous. The basic theoretical 
assumption about switching costs is that once a consumer purchases a product, he is 
locked in it.   
       The vast theoretical literature on switching costs is summarized by Klemperer 
(1987a, b, and c).  Klemperer (1987a) shows that the existence of switching costs leads 
to market segmentation, and reduces the elasticity of demand facing each firm.  
Klemperer also shows that non-cooperative equilibrium in an oligopoly model with 
switching costs may be the same as the collusive outcome in an otherwise identical 
market without switching costs.  There are three major types of consumers’ switching 
costs: 
A) Transaction costs that are associated with changing identical products or          
services, such as returning rented equipment to one firm and renting identical 
equipment from an alternative supplier. 
B) Learning costs that are associated with learning how to use a service or how   
new product works, such as learning new computer software. 
C) Contractual costs that are present because of special programs, discounts, or 
contracts requiring the customer to pay a penalty to switch suppliers, such as 
home loan penalty fees required to switch home loan providers.   
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      The credit card market is a potential market where both search and switching costs 
are likely to be present.  The basic theoretical assumptions about switching costs can 
be applied to the credit card industry.  Kim et al. (2003) argue that banking is one of the 
major sectors of the economy in which switching costs appear to be prevalent.   In this 
market, switching costs (costs of obtaining a new card) would mean that consumers 
may view credit cards as functionally identical before they get a card, but might not 
immediately switch from their current card to a card with a lower rate (Stango, 2002).  
Stango suggests the following three assumptions about switching costs in the credit 
card industry: 
1. New and existing customers pay different rates on their cards in the credit card 
            market. 
2. Consumers have different values of switching costs (low vs. high switching 
costs). 
3. Credit card issuers face pools of customers that vary in their degree of lock-in.  
       There is considerable evidence supporting the existence of the switching costs in 
the credit card industry.  The pricing structure of the market in which card issuers offer 
low introductory rates to new potential customers is consistent with the existence of 
switching costs. There are some one-time inconveniences, expenses, and efforts 
incurred each time a consumer switches from one card to another.  Consumers also 
face information costs in searching for the best rates offered by banks on their credit 
cards.  Some consumers maintain a loyalty toward a product they have been using for a 
long time.  They may also build up frequent-fliers miles on their cards, have their utility 
bills automatically charged, or enjoy the familiarity of having the same account for a long 
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time.  Because consumers have different motives for holding credit cards, they have 
different incentives to incur certain costs of searching for lower interest rate terms (Kim, 
Dunn, and Mumy, 2005).   
       Ausubel (1991) and Stango (2002) argue that some credit card fees, such as the 
card annual fee, may prevent consumers from switching cards as it becomes costly for 
customers to switch or to carry more than one card.  These added costs for switching 
may explain why consumers do not switch cards when they are offered to do so, which 
contributes to the failure of competition in this industry as theorized by Ausubel (1991).    
 
2.6. The Importance of Consumers’ Switching Costs 
        Switching costs have far reaching consequences on the working of the credit 
market.  They increase borrowers’ lock-in and grant the incumbent bank an ex post 
monopoly power over its customers.  Switching costs may also explain why banks may 
prefer to maximize their current market share.  Having a large base of borrowers today 
will increase future profits given customers’ lock-in.  Klemperer (1987a) shows that, in 
general, the existence of switching costs lead to market segmentation, and reduces the 
elasticity of demand facing each firm.  Even with non-cooperative behavior, the 
switching costs lead to an outcome similar to the collusion solution, with the derivative 
of price with respect to marginal cost being less than one.  When the derivative of price 
with respect to marginal cost is less than one, the industry deviates from being perfectly 
competitive, especially when some important perfect competition assumptions are 
dropped.  
31 
      Consumers’ switching costs have important strategic implications for firms who 
compete vigorously to build market share before consumers attach themselves to 
suppliers.  Among those implications are:  
1. Switching costs provide a basis for the differentiation of a competing offering in a                     
given market place for a given period of time. 
2. Switching costs influence future consumer behavior, such as increasing loyalty 
by making it difficult for the customer to switch. 
3. Reducing switching costs for potential customers may make it easier to acquire 
new customers. Moreover, switching costs can create a barrier to entry for new 
supplying firms (Klemperer, 1987c).   
4. Switching costs generally raise prices, discourage new entries, and reduce 
market competitiveness (Klemperer, 1995).        
       Empirical evidence investigating the existence of consumers’ switching costs in the 
credit card market is limited.  This is because switching costs are intangible costs which 
are difficult to measure.  There is little empirical literature concerning this issue.    
       Ausubel (1991) researched the possibility that consumers’ switching costs may 
exist in the credit card market, thus explaining the extraordinary profits of card issuers.  
He provides some information that shows that switching and search costs may explain 
the high interest rates on credit card balances, and he was the first to research the 
possibility that consumers’ switching costs may explain the extraordinary profits of card 
issuers.  However, Ausubel (1991) finds that switching costs are not large enough to 
explain the deviation of the industry from being perfectly competitive due to the industry 
rate stickiness.  
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       Canner and Luckett (1992) argue that consumers with high levels of balances have 
difficulty switching balances to credit card plans that offer reduced rates.  High balances 
make these consumers less attractive to card issuers as the probability of their default 
increases. 
       Calem and Mester (1995) show that search and switching costs result in adverse 
selection in the credit card market.  Specifically, if a bank unilaterally lowers its interest 
rate, it will mainly attract cardholders who search most for interest rates.  Cardholders 
with large balances who yield high profits would be less able to transfer their balances 
to a new card issuer due to asymmetric information between card issuers.  They also   
show that consumers carry balances on their cards with fairly high interest rates, 
despite receiving offers from cards with fairly low interest rates.  The reason behind 
doing so is that consumers with high balances have difficulty switching cards.  
According to Calem and Mester there are two explanations for this problem.  First, 
consumers with high balances are reluctant searchers for better rates as the probability 
of being denied credit increases with high outstanding balances.  Second, consumers 
with high credit card balances would search for the lowest rates to switch cards.  
However, these consumers are less likely to be approved credit as card issuers use 
consumer debt-to-income ratios to determine whether card applicants will be approved.   
       Park (1997), using a sample of major credit card issuers, finds that “the low 
elasticity of demand for credit card loans implies consumer irrationality and imperfect 
information.”  Park’s (1997) study findings are consistent with those of Ausubel (1991) 
and Calem & Mester (1995).  Park argues that cardholders sluggishly respond to 
changes in card rates.  Park argues that cardholders with high balances have high 
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switching costs, while cardholders with small balances do not care much about credit 
card rates. 
       Stango (2002) adopts the basic assumption of switching costs models to the credit 
card market. He shows that switching costs are an important influence on pricing for 
commercial banks, suggesting that there is a relationship between default rates and 
switching costs, and that credit card issuers’ pricing is positively correlated with some 
proxies for switching costs.  He empirically examines the relationship between switching 
costs and prices, which can be written as a function of the switching costs of an issuer’s 
and a competitor’s customers.  Stango also shows that extending credit to risky 
students on college campuses, for example, may be profitable because these 
customers have high switching costs.  Stango also points out that there are consumers 
who carry balances on their credit cards with fairly high interest rates, despite receiving 
offers for cards with lower rates.   
       Based on these findings, it seems to be rational for credit card issuers to view high 
balances as bad signals.  If search and switching costs exist in the credit card industry, 
then lowering interest rates will attract consumers with a high probability of default. 
       The following common facts in the credit card market may be consistent with the 
existence of switching and search costs in this industry: 
1. Consumers carry balances on their credit cards with fairly high interest rates, 
despite receiving offers for cards with lower rates. Of course, there are other 
groups of consumers who consistently switch cards, moving from one card to   
another to   take advantage of the offered teaser rates (Stango, 2002). 
2. Banks often offer incentives (teaser rates) to attract convenience users (30-40% 
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of the credit card users) who pay their balances in full every billing period because 
some of them may become interest–paying credit card users (revolvers)  in the 
future (Chakravorti and Emmons, 2003). 
3. Consumer–level data consistently show that many consumers carry balances on 
their credit cards with fairly high interest rates, indicating that consumers are 
becoming more insensitive to interest-rate selection as they feel they will never 
get a better rate (Stango, 2002).  
4. Banks tend to price discriminate between their pre-existing customers and rivals’ 
borrowers by offering low introductory rates to the latter (poaching strategies).  
Introductory offers take two forms: discounts on new purchases and discount on 
balance transfers for a fixed period of time (usually 6-12 months). The interest 
rate usually reverts to the cards’ standard variable rate after the introductory 
period expires.    
5. Consumers with high outstanding balances are reluctant to engage in search for 
           a lower price, because they are less likely to be approved for a new card.      
       Chen (1997) argues that card issuers actually pay customers to switch using 
introductory teaser rates on purchases and balance transfers which is an indicator of 
the presence of switching costs in the credit card market.  Competing firms routinely 
provide discounts (monetary payments) to new customers for switching from a 
competitor(s), and thus charge lower prices to those customers. In standard economic 
terms, this is obviously a form of third-degree price discrimination.  This is due to banks 
being aware of the existence of switching costs, therefore having to tease new 
customers by offering low introductory rates. Chen shows that in a two-period 
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homogeneous-good duopoly model, the equilibrium amount of discounts offered by card 
issuers increases continuously in the expected switching costs of a typical consumer. 
Chen also finds that “firms are worse off engaging in the discriminatory pricing, while 
consumers need not necessarily benefit from it”.  In general, because switching costs 
exist, banks will offer low introductory rates to the rival’s customers with respect to the 
interest rates charged to their old borrowers (Barone, Felici and Pagnini, 2006).   
        Recognizing the importance of reducing search and switching costs faced by 
cardholders who are willing to switch cards for better rates, credit card issuers have 
spent large amounts on advertising to induce consumers to switch cards by reducing 
search and switching costs for the consumers they seek (Zywicki, 2000).  Marketing 
techniques to induce consumers to switch their current credit cards include: offering low 
introductory rates on balance transfer and new purchases, issuing gold and platinum 
cards with substantial benefits, increasing consumer information about their new 
products benefits, and waiving annual fees.  The solicitations calls from the card issuers 
have increased tremendously in the last two decades.  An important consequence of 
these solicitations has been the offer of low introductory rates on balance transfers, 
encouraging card holders to carry balances from one billing period to another, and 
making balance switching a routine matter as it has become much easier for consumers 
to search for better rates in the credit card market.        
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CHAPTER 3 
                                       A THEORETICAL MODEL 
    
 
3.1. Introduction 
      The purpose of this chapter is to use a simple version of Klemperer’s (1987a) two-
period model of Bertrand–type price competition applied to the credit card industry in 
order to show that in the presence of switching costs (or “brand loyalty”), firms will 
charge lower prices in the first period (than they otherwise would) to gain market share 
and then charge higher prices in the future.   This will happen if firms have perfect 
foresight, and it may lead to either higher or lower equilibrium profits than if firms 
behave myopically.   
      Klemperer (1987a) employs a two-period Bertrand–type price competition model to 
show that firms compete aggressively in the early stages of the market development to 
gain market share that will be valuable to them in the second period (the mature 
market).    
      Stango (2000) presents a dynamic model of price competition to explain the 
emphasis that credit card issuers place on building market shares.  Credit card issuers 
charge lower rates in the first period and higher rates in the second period utilizing the 
market shares they have gained in the first period.   
      Credit card issuing banks face a trade-off between offering low introductory rates in 
the first period (the primary market) to attract consumers and lock them in and charge 
high rates in the second period to extract higher profits (rents) from its already locked–in 
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customers (Kim et al., 2003).  This is the case where credit card issuers are acting with 
perfect foresight. 
 
3.2 The Theoretical Model  
       This model consists of a single industry within a country consisting of two 
duopolists selling to domestic consumers.  Consider two banks, A and B, producing 
functionally identical products, such as credit cards.  They are competitively offering 
non-collateralized lines of credit in two different markets: a first-period ‘primary market’, 
and a second-period ‘mature market’. The primary market is the first level of competition 
between banks to capture market share that will be valuable to them in the second 
period (the mature market).  Because market share is valuable to these banks in the 
future, they compete more aggressively than they otherwise would to capture the 
highest market share possible.  The mature market (the second market) is the second 
level of competition where credit card issuers compete for each other’s existing 
customers.  Firms will choose their strategic variables (ଵ, ଶ) to maximize their total 
discounted future profits.   For example, they may choose to offer lower prices (interest 
rates) in the first period to attract consumers who come to this market seeking credit for 
the first time, such as college students.   On the other hand, firms also recognize that 
their second-period profits depend on their first-period sales and therefore they have an 
incentive to invest in their market shares.  Since demand is symmetric between the two 
banks, it is sufficient to analyze the behavior of one of the banks as the first main step of 
deriving the equilibrium outcome.  In the following, I analyze it from the viewpoint of 
bank A. 
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       Bank A’s first-period (primary market) and second-period (mature market) profits 
functions under Bertrand competition are   
               p1A(ଵ୅, ଵ୆) ൌ (ଵ୅– C)S1A(ଵ୅, ଵ୆) – F                                                          (1)                                                          
and       
                p2A(ଶ୅, ଶ୆, ଵ୅, ଵ୆) ൌ (ଶ୅ –  C)S2A(ଶ୅ǡ ଶ୆, S1A(ଵ୅ǡ ଵ୆)) – F                     (2)                                                    
where the first subscript denotes the period (market) and the second subscript denotes 
the firm, and 
       p1A is bank A’s first-period profits, 
       p2A is bank A’s second-period profits, 
       ଵ୅ is bank A’s first-period price (interest rate),  
       ଵ୆ is bank B’s first-period price (interest rate),  
       S1A is the demand function for bank A’s credit cards in the first period, 
       S1B is the demand function for bank B’s credit cards in the first period, 
       C is the (constant) marginal cost for each bank,  
       ଶ୅is bank A’s second-period price (interest rate),       
       ଶ୆ is bank B’s second-period price (interest rate),       
       S2A is bank A’s second-period demand function, 
       S2B is bank B’s second-period demand function, 
       F is fixed cost.  
Bank A’s total discounted profits are given by   
               pAൌ  p1A + λp2A                                                                                                                                                 (3)                                                          
where  λ  is a discount factor. 
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      The symmetric demand functions for the two firms  (duopolists)  in the first period as 
functions of the prices (ଵ୅ ,ଵ୆) are                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
               S1A(ଵ୅, ଵ୆) ൌ a – bଵ୅ + γ ଵ୆                                                                                                       (4)                                                          
               S1B (ଵ୅, ଵ୆) ൌ a – bଵ୆+ γଵ୅                                                                     (5)                                                          
where  a, b, and γ are the parameters of the demand function.   The natural restrictions 
are that a > 0, b > 0 and b ≥ γ ≥  0.   Equation (4) states that market demand for bank A’s 
product (credit card) is downward sloping in its own price (law of demand) and 
increases with increases in its competitor’s price (since the goods are substitutes).  
When γ = 0, the products are independent or unrelated and each firm has monopolistic 
market power.  Whenever γ > 0, the products are substitutes.  If γ = b, the total demand 
for the two goods is fixed (as seen by adding (4) and (5)).  The economic meanings of 
the above demand functions parameters are as follows.  a is a positive constant (the y-
axis intercept).  It measures quality in a vertical sense. Other things being equal, an 
increase in a increases the marginal utility of consuming the good.  b is the slope of the 
demand curve.   It captures the degree of ‘own price sensitivity’, indicating how quantity 
demanded is affected by a change in own price.  γ measures the substitutability 
between the products, indicating how quantity demanded is affected by a change in  the 
cross-price of related goods (bank B’s price).         
       Each firm competes by setting its price (Bertrand competition) and letting the 
market clear.  The oligopolistic structure is one of Bertrand price setters in a 
differentiated product market. In period 1, bank A chooses its first-period priceଵ୅to 
maximize its total discounted future profits, taking bank B’s first-period price as given. 
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Substituting (4) in (1), bank A’s first-period profit function becomes 
                   p1A ൌ (ଵ୅– C) (a – bଵ୅+ γଵ୆) – F                                                                         (6)                                                          
The second–period demand function faced by bank A’s is assumed to be given by  
                   S2A (ଶ୅, ଶ୆, S1A(ଵ୅, ଵ୆))ൌ  A – bଶ୅+ γଶ୆  + dS1A(ଵ୅,ଵ୆)                                                      
                                          ൌ  A – bଶ୅ + γଶ୆+ d(a – bଵ୅ + γଵ୆)        (7)                                                          
where A is a positive constant, d is a parameter that measures the extent to which 
consumers who previously used bank A's product in the first-period are locked into the 
firm’s product in the second period, and where the second equality follows from (4).  
Substituting (7) in (2), the second period (the mature market) profits become 
        p2A ൌ (ଶ୅ – C) (A – bଶ୅+ γଶ୆  + d(a – βଵ୅ + γଵ୆)) – F                            (8)                                                          
        Assume first that each firm acts myopically and ignores the effect that its first-
period price has on its second-period profits. Differentiating (6) with respect to P1A, the 
first order condition for bank A’s profit maximizing problem is given by 
                           
ப஠భఽப୔భఽ ൌa – 2bଵ୅+ γଵ୆+ Cbൌ  0                                                                         (9)                                               
                                                                    
Setting ଵ ൌ ଵ୅ ൌ ଵ୆and solving, we have the first–period symmetric equilibrium price 
in the myopic case  
   ଵ ൌ ଵ୅ ൌ ଵ୆ ൌ ߙ൅ܥߚʹߚെߛ                                                                           (10)                                                          
Differentiating (8) with respect to ଶ୅, the first order condition for bank A’s profit 
maximization problem in the second period is given by  
  ∂piమఽ
∂୔మఽ ൌ ܣ − ʹߚܲʹܣ ൅ ߛܲʹܤ ൅ ߜߙ − ߚܲͳܣߜ ൅ ߜߛܲͳܤ ൅ ܥߚ ൌ Ͳ                       (11)                                                          
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Settingଵ ൌ ଵ୅ ൌ ଵ୆, and ଶ ൌଶ୅ ൌ ଶ୆and then solving forଶ, we get the second-
period symmetric equilibrium price ଶ ൌ ଶ୅ ൌ ଶ୆ ൌ ܣ൅ߜቀߙെܲͳ൫ߚെߛ൯ቁ൅ܥߚʹߚെߛ                                     (12)                                                          
Substituting (10) in (12), we obtain the second-period symmetric equilibrium price in the 
myopic case 
       ଶ ൌ ଶ୅ ൌ ଶ୆ ൌ ܣ൅ߜቆߙെ൬ߙ൅ܥߚʹߚെߛ൰൫ߚെߛ൯ቇ൅ܥߚʹߚെߛ                                  (13) 
       Consider now a perfect foresight analysis where each firm sets its first-period price, 
taking into account not only the effect of doing so on its first-period profitability, but also 
the effect on its first-period market share and hence the second-period profitability.   
Bank A chooses its prices to maximize its total future discounted profit.  If firms care 
about the future, then they will compete more fiercely for new customers since these 
customers will become valuable repeat-purchasers in the second period.  In the two-
period model of Klemperer (1987a, b) this implies charging lower prices in the first 
period than in the absence of this effect.  In period 1, bank A chooses its first-period 
priceଵ୅to maximize its total discounted future profits, taking bank B’s first-period price 
as given. 
       Combining (6) and (8), bank A’s total discounted future profits are given by 
                       pA ൌ (ଵ୅– C) (a – bଵ୅ + γଵ୆) – F + λ[(ଶ୅– C) ( (A – b ଶ୅+ γଶ୆)  
                            + d (a – bଵ୅+ γଵ୆) – F]                                                                    (14)                                                          
Differentiating (14) with respect toଵ୅, we get  
                  
ப஠ఽப୔భఽ ൌ a – 2bଵ୅ + γଵ୆+ Cb – λଶ୅dβ + Cdbλ ൌ 0                           (15)                                                          
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In a symmetric equilibrium where  ଵ ൌ ଵ୅ ൌ ଵ୆ and ଶ ൌ ଶ୅ ൌ ଶ୆ 
           ଵ ൌ ଵ୅ ൌ ଵ୆ ൌ ߙ൅ܥߚ൫ͳ൅ߣߜ൯െߣߜߚܲʹʹߚെߛ                                      (16)                                                          
Differentiating (14) with respect toଶ୅, we get  ߲ߨܣ߲ܲʹܣ ൌ λA – 2λbଶ+ λγଶ+ λda – λdbଵ + λdγଵ+ λCbൌ  0               (17)                                                          
and making the same symmetry assumptions stated before (16), we get ଶ ൌ ଶ୅ ൌ ଶ୆ ൌ ܣ൅ߜߙെߜߚܲͳ൅ߜߛܲͳ൅ܥߚʹߚെߛ                                           (18)                                                          
Rearranging (16) and (18), yields          
                      (2b – γ)ଵ+ (λdb)ଶ ൌ a + Cb + Cbdλ                                                     (19)                                                          
                      (db – dγ)ଵ+ (2b – γ)ଶ ൌ A + da + C                                                           (20)                                        
    
Using Cramer’s rule, we can solve forଵ  and ଶto derive the non-cooperative price-
setting equilibrium in both periods in the perfect foresight case:                                                                                                                              
  ଵܲ ൌ ቤߙ൅ܥߚ൅ܥߚߜߣߣߜߚܣ൅ߜߙ൅ܥߚʹߚെߛቤቤʹߚെߛߣߜߚߜ൫ߚെߛ൯ʹߚെߛ ቤ                                                                                                                                                                                                   ൌ ሺఈା஼ఉା஼ఉఋఒሻሺଶఉିఊሻȂሺ஺ାఋఈା஼ఉሻሺఒఋఉሻሺଶఉିఊሻሺଶఉିఊሻȂሺఋఉିఋఊሻሺఒఋఉሻ                    (21)                                                          
and 
    ଶܲ ൌ ቤʹߚെߛߙ൅ܥߚ൅ܥߚߜߣߜߚെߜߛܣ൅ߜߙ൅ܥߚቤቤʹߚെߛߣߜߚߜ൫ߚെߛ൯ʹߚെߛቤ                                                                                                                                                                                             ൌ ሺଶఉିఊሻሺ஺ାఋఈା஼ఉሻȂሺఋఉିఋఊሻሺఈା஼ఉା஼ఉఋఒሻሺଶఉିఊሻሺଶఉିఊሻିሺఋఉିఋఊሻሺఒఋఉሻ                           (22)                                                          
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3.3.  Comparisons between the Myopic and Perfect-Foresight Equilibria 
3.3.1. The Case C ൌ 0 and δ ൌ 0 
      From (10) and (13) with δ ൌ 0, it follows that equilibrium prices in the first and 
second periods in the myopic case are  
    ଵ ൌ ଵ୅ ൌ ଵ୆ ൌ ߙ൅ܥߚʹߚെߛ                                                                                                 (23)                                                          ଶ ൌ ଶ୅ ൌ ଶ୆ ൌ ܣ൅ܥߚʹߚെߛ                                                                        (24)                                                          
Similarly, from (21) and (22) with δ = 0, it follows that the equilibrium prices in the 
perfect foresight case are     ଵ ൌ ଵ୅ ൌ ଵ୆ ൌ Ƚ൅ȾʹȾȂɀ                                                                                 (25)                                                          ଶ ൌ ଶ୅ ൌଶ୆ ൌ ܣ൅ܥߚʹߚെߛ                                                           (26) 
       I will consider the following parameter values for numerical example 1. 
                    α ൌ 10, Aൌ 10, λ ൌ 0.7, β ൌ 2, δ ൌ 0, γ ൌ 1, C ൌ 0, Fൌ 0.                      (27)                                                          
Inserting C ൌ 0 and the other values in (27) into equations (23) and (24), the myopic 
prices are   ଵ ൌ ଵ୅ ൌ ଵ୆ ൌ ߙʹߚെߛ ൌ3.333                                                                    (28) ଶ ൌ ଶ୅ ൌ ଶ୆ ൌ ܣʹߚെߛ ൌ3.333                                                                   (29) 
      Inserting C ൌ  0 and the other values in (27) in equations (25) and (26), the perfect-
foresight prices are ଵ ൌ ଵ୅ ൌ ଵ୆ ൌ ߙʹߚെߛ ൌ3.333                                                          (30)                                                          ଶ ൌ ଶ୅ ൌ ଶ୆ ൌ ܣʹߚെߛ ൌ3.333                                                                   (31) 
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       We have, from (23) – (26), or from (28) – (31), 
Proposition 1:  If δ ൌ 0, so there are no switching costs (or “brand loyalty") in the 
second period, then the first-period equilibrium price in the myopic case is equal to the 
first-period equilibrium price in the perfect foresight case, and the second-period 
equilibrium price in the myopic case is equal to the second-period equilibrium price in 
the perfect foresight case.    
       
       Using equations (6), (8), P1 ൌ P1A ൌ P1B, P2 ൌ P2Aൌ P2B, and (27), the equilibrium 
profits of each firm in periods 1 and 2 are 
                   p1ൌ  p1A ൌ p1B ൌ ଵ(a – bଵ + γଵ)                                                            (32)                                                          
                     p2 ൌ p2A ൌ p2B ൌ ଶ(A – b ଶ+ γଶ)                                                              (33)                                                          
From (3), (32) and (33), each firm’s present value of profits is  
                   pA ൌ pBൌ  p1 + λp2                                                                                          (34)                                                          
        First consider profits in the myopic case.  Using equations (27), (28), and (32), 
profits in the first period are 
                      p1  ൌ p1Aൌ  p1B ൌ ଵ(a – bଵ+ γଵ)ൌ  ߙʹߚሺʹߚെߛሻʹ ൌ 22.221                           (35) 
Using equations (27), (29), and (33), profits in the second period are           
                      p2  ൌ p2Aൌ  p2B ൌ ଶ(A – b ଶ+ γଶሻ ൌ ஺మఉሺଶఉିఊሻమ ൌ22.221                         (36) 
Using equations (27), (34), (35) and (36), it follows that the total discounted future 
profits are:                                                                                                                                                                     
                    pAൌ  pB ൌ 22.222 + .7(22.221) ൌ 37.775                                                                           (37)                                                          
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       Now consider the perfect foresight case.  Using (27), (30), and (32), profits in the 
first period are 
                     p1 ൌ p1A ൌ p1B ൌ ଵ(a – bଵ+ γଵ) ൌ ߙʹߚሺʹߚെߛሻʹ ൌ 22.221                        (38)                                                          
Using (27), (31), and (33), profits in the second period are 
                      p2 ൌ p 2Aൌ p2B ൌ ଶ(A – b ଶ+ γଶ) ൌ ܣʹߚሺʹߚെߛሻʹ ൌ 22.221                        (39)                                                          
From (27), (34), (38) and (39), each firm’s present value of profits is                                                           
                      pA ൌ pBൌ  22.221 + .7 (22.221) ൌ 37.775                                                (40)                                                          
       We therefore have: 
 
Proposition 2: If δ ൌ 0, so there are no switching costs (or “brand loyalty”) in the 
second period, then the profits of each firm (first period, second period, and total) are 
the same under myopic behavior as under perfect foresight.> 
 
3.3.2. The Case Cൌ  0 and δ ൐0 
       From (10) and (13) with Cൌ 0, it follows that equilibrium prices in the two periods in 
the myopic case are ଵ ൌ ଵ୅ ൌ ଵ୆ ൌ ߙʹߚെߛ                          (41)                                                          
ଶ ൌ ଶ୅ ൌ ଶ୆ ൌ ܣ൅ߜቆߙെ൬ ߙʹߚെߛ൰൫ߚെߛ൯ቇʹߚെߛ                                                 (42) 
Using (21) and (22) with C ൌ 0, it follows that equilibrium prices in the two periods in 
the perfect foresight case are 
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ଵ ൌ ଵ୅ ൌ ଵ୆ ൌ ߙ൫ʹߚെߛ൯െߣߜߚ൫ܣ൅ߜߙ൯൫ʹߚെߛ൯൫ʹߚെߛ൯Ȃ൫ߜߚെߜߛ൯൫ߣߜߚ൯                                (43)                                                          
ʹ ൌ ʹ ൌ ʹ ൌ ቀʹߚെߛቁቀܣ൅ߜቁെߙߜቀߚെߛቁቀʹߚെߛቁቀʹߚെߛቁȂቀߜߚെߜߛቁቀߣߜߚቁ                                 (44)                                                          
       I will consider the following parameter values for numerical example 2. 
                       αൌ 10, A ൌ10, λ ൌ 0.7, βൌ  2, δ ൌ 0.2, γ ൌ 1, C ൌ 0, F ൌ 0.      (45)                                                          
Inserting the values in (45) in equations (41) and (42), prices in the myopic case are ଵ ൌ ଵ୅ ൌ ଵ୆ ൌ ߙʹߚെߛ ൌ3.333                                                        (46) 
ଶ ൌ ଶܲ஺ ൌ ଶܲ஻ ൌ ܣ൅ߜቆߙെ൬ ߙʹߚെߛ൰൫ߚെߛ൯ቇʹߚെߛ ൌ3.777                            (47)                                                                 
Inserting the values in (45) in equations (43) and (44), prices under perfect foresight 
case are ଵ ൌ ଵ୅ ൌ ଵ୆ ൌ ߙ൫ʹߚെߛ൯Ȃ൫ܣ൅ߜߙ൯൫ߣߜߚ൯൫ʹߚെߛ൯൫ʹߚെߛ൯െ൫ߜߚെߜߛ൯൫ߣߜߚ൯ ൌ2.978                  (48)                                                          ଶ ൌ ଶ୅ ൌ ଶ୆ ൌ ൫ʹߚെߛ൯൫ܣ൅ߜ൯െߙߜ൫ߚെߛ൯൫ʹߚെߛ൯൫ʹߚെߛ൯Ȃ൫ߜߚെߜߛ൯൫ߣߜߚ൯ ൌ3.197                 (49)                                                          
       Hence we have the following proposition 
 
Proposition 3:  From (46)–(49), it follows that in the presence of switching costs (or 
“brand loyalty”), since δ > 0, then firms will charge lower prices in the first period than if 
there were no switching costs (or “brand loyalty”), that is δൌ  0.  Firms acting myopically 
set an equilibrium price in the first period that is independent of how big δ is.  Firms 
typically set lower prices in the first period in order to capture the market share that will 
be valuable to them in the future and charge higher prices in the second period.  A first-
period price cut that increases a firm’s first-period market share (demand) foretells a 
second-period price rise. 
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      Using equations (6), (8), P1 ൌ  P1A ൌ P1B, P2 ൌ P2A ൌ P2B, and (45), the equilibrium  
profits of each firm in the first and second periods are 
                   p1 ൌ p1A ൌ p1B ൌ ଵ(a – bଵ+ γଵ)                                                            (50)                                                          
                     p2 ൌ p2Aൌ p2B ൌ ଶ(A – bଶ + γଶ)                                                              (51)                                                          
From (3), (50) and (51), each firm’s present value of profits is  
                      pA ൌ pB  ൌ p1 + λp2                                                                                                                              (52) 
       First consider profits in the myopic case.  Using equations (45), (46), and (50), 
profits in the first period are 
                   p1ൌ  p1A ൌ p1B ൌ  ଵ(a – bଵ+ γଵ)ൌ  22.222                                      (53)                                                          
 Using equations (45), (47), and (51), profits in the second period are            
                    p2 ൌ p2A ൌ p2B ൌ ଶ(A – bଶ + γଶ) ൌ 28.544                                              (54) 
Using equations (45), (52), (53) and (54), it follows that the total discounted future 
profits under myopic case are                                                                                                                                                                     
                    pA ൌ pB ൌ 22.222 + .7(28.544)ൌ 42.200                                                                            (55)                                                          
       Now consider the perfect foresight case.  Using (45), (48), and (50), profits in the 
first period are 
                     p1ൌ  p1A ൌ p1B ൌ ଵ(a – bଵ+ γଵ) ൌ 20.913                                               (56)                                                          
Using (45), (48), and (51), profits in the second period are 
                      p2ൌ  p2A ൌ p2B ൌ ଶ(A – bଶ + γଶ) ൌ 26.239                                            (57)                                                          
From (45), (52), (56) and (57), each firm’s present value of profits under perfect 
foresight case is  
                     pA ൌ pB ൌ 20.913 + .7(26.239) ൌ 39.727                                                  (58)                                                          
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      We therefore have: 
 
Proposition 4:  From (53) through (58), we see that A’s total discounted profits in the 
perfect foresight case is less than the total discounted profits in the myopic case.  In the 
myopic case, bank A makes more profits in both periods than it makes in the perfect 
foresight case.  Therefore, in the presence of switching costs, firms will have a degree 
of monopoly power over their customers, leading to higher prices and profits in the 
future.  
 
3.3.3. The Case γ = 0 
       From (10) and (13) with γ ൌ 0, it follows that the myopic prices in the first and 
second periods are 
                 ͳ ൌ ͳ ൌ ͳ ൌ ఈା஼ఉଶఉ                                              (59)                                                          
        ʹ ൌ ʹ ൌ ʹ ൌ ஺ାഃഀమ ା஼ఉቀଵିഃమቁଶఉ                                                (60)                                                          
Using (21) and (22) with γൌ 0, we obtain the perfect-foresight prices in the first and 
second periods. 
                ଵ ൌ ଵ୅ ൌ ଵ୆ ൌ ʹߙ൅ʹܥߚ൅ߣߜܥߚെܣߣߜെߣߜʹߙͶߚെߣߜʹߚ                             (61)                                                          
  ଶ ൌ ଶ୅ ൌ ଶ୆ ൌ ʹܣ൅ߙߜ൅ʹܥߚȂܥߚߜെܥߚߜʹߣͶߚെߣߜʹߚ                           (62)                                                          
       I will consider the following parameter values for numerical example 3.                                                                                                                                                                    
                     α ൌ 10, A ൌ 10, λ ൌ 0.7, δ ൌ 0.2, βൌ 2, γ ൌ 0, C ൌ 0, F ൌ 0.                  (63) 
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Inserting C ൌ 0 and other values in (63) in equations (59) and (60), prices in the myopic 
case areଵ ൌ ଵ୅ ൌ ଵ୆ ൌ ߙʹߚ ൌ2.500                                                         (64)                                                          
     ଶ ൌ ଶ୅ ൌ ଶ୆ ൌ ܣ൅ߜߙʹʹߚ ൌ2.750                                                    (65)                                                          
Inserting C ൌ 0 and other values in (63) in (61) and (62), the perfect-foresight prices in 
the first and second periods are 
ଵ ൌ ଵ୅ ൌ ଵ୆ ൌʹߙെܣߣߜെߣߜʹߙͶߚെߣߜʹߚ ൌ2.306                            (66)                                                          
ʹ ൌ ʹ ൌ ʹ ൌ ʹܣ൅ߙߜͶߚെߣߜʹߚ ൌ2.769                                             (67)                                                          
       Hence, we have: 
 
Proposition 5: Equations (64) through (67) state equilibrium prices under the 
assumption of no substitutability, that is γ ൌ 0, so that the demands for the two firms are  
unrelated or independent.  This means that demand for bank A’s product does not 
depend at all on bank B’s product price, so each firm is a monopoly in its market.  
       
        Using equations (6), (8), P1 ൌ P1Aൌ  P1B, P2ൌ  P2A ൌ P2B, and (63), the equilibrium 
profits of each firm in periods 1 and 2 are 
                                  p1 ൌ p1A ൌ p1B ൌ ଵ(a – bଵ)                                                          (68)                                                          
                                  p2ൌ  p2A ൌ p2B ൌ ଶ(A - bଶ + d(a – bଵ) )                                     (69)                                                          
From equation (3), each firm’s present value of profits is  
                                  pAൌ  pB ൌ  p1 + λp2                                                                                                          (70)                                                          
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       Using equations (63), (64), and (68), profits in the myopic case in the first period 
are 
                               p1ൌ p1A ൌ p1B ൌ ଵ(a – bଵ) ൌ  ఈ;ସఉ ൌ12.500                                    (71)                                                          
Using equations (63), (65), and (69), profits in the myopic case in the second period 
are            
                            p2 ൌ p2Aൌ  p2B  ൌ  ሺ஺ାభమఋఈሻమସఉ   ൌ 15.125                                          (72)                                                          
Using equations (63), (70), (71) and (72), the myopic total discounted profits are                                                                                                                                                        
                            pAൌ pB ൌ 12.500 + 0.7(15.125)ൌ 23.088                                        (73)                                                          
       Using (63), (66), and (68), the perfect-foresight profits are in the first period are 
                               p1ൌ  p1Aൌ  p1B ൌ  ൫ʹן൅ܣߣߜ൯ሺʹߙȂܣߣߜെߣߜʹߙሻߚሺͶെߣߜʹሻʹ ൌ 12.425               (74)                                                          
Using (63), (66), (67), and (69), the perfect-foresight profits are in the second period are 
                               p2 ൌ p2A ൌp2B ൌ ൫ʹܣ൅ߙߜ൯ሺʹܣߚ൅ߚߙߜሻሺͶߚെߣߜʹߚሻʹ  ൌ15.339                            (75)                                                          
Using equation (63), (70), (74), and (75), the perfect-foresight total discounted profits 
are      
                                pA ൌ pB ൌ 12.425 + 0.7(15.339) ൌ 23.162                                      (76)                                                          
       Hence we have the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 6: If firms ignore each other’s pricing behavior, in this case γ ൌ 0, we have 
lower prices and profits in both periods in both the myopic case and the perfect foresight 
case than if goods were substitutes or related, that is γ > 0.  In addition the result tells 
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that both firms’ equilibrium profits are lower when goods are independent and products 
are totally differentiated in both the first and second periods.  Moreover, bank A makes 
less first-period profits in the perfect foresight case than it does in the myopic case.  On 
the other hand, bank A’s second period and total discounted profits are higher in the 
perfect foresight case than they are in the myopic case. 
 
3.3.4. Case where C ൌ0 and b ൌγ 
       From (10) and (13) with b ൌγ and C ൌ 0, it follows that the myopic prices are ଵ ൌ ଵ୅ ൌ ଵ୆ ൌ ߙߚ                                                                      (77) ଶ ൌ ଶ୅ ൌ ଶ୆ ൌ ܣ൅ߙߜߚ                                                       (78) 
From (21) and (22) with b ൌγ and Cൌ  0, it follows that the perfect-foresight prices are 
ଵ ൌଵ୅ ൌଵ୆ ൌ ߙȂߣߙߜʹെܣߣߜߚ                                            (79) ଶ ൌ ଶ୅ ൌ ଶ୆ ൌ ܣ൅ߙߜߚ                                                                         (80) 
I will consider the following parameter values for numerical example 4. 
                           a ൌ 10, A ൌ10, λൌ  0.7, δ ൌ  0.2, β ൌ 2, γ ൌ 2, C ൌ 0, F ൌ 0.            (81) 
Inserting the values in (81) in equations (77) and (78), the myopic prices are ଵ ൌ ଵ୅ ൌ ଵ୆ ൌ ߙߚ ൌ 5.000                                                                             (82) ଶ ൌ ଶ୅ ൌଶ୆ ൌ ܣ൅ߙߜߚ ൌ 6.000                                                         (83)                                                          
Inserting the values in (81) in equations (79) and (80), prices in the perfect foresight 
case are 
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ଵ ൌ ଵ୅ ൌ ଵ୆ ൌ ߙȂߣߙߜʹെܣߣߜߚ ൌ 4.160                                           (84) ଶ ൌ ଶ୅ ൌ ଶ୆ ൌܣ൅ߙߜߚ ൌ 6.000                                        (85) 
       Therefore, we have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 7:  Given that the total demand for the goods is fixed, that is b ൌγ, then we 
have higher prices in both periods in both the myopic case and the perfect foresight 
case than in the case where demand for the goods is independent, that is γ ൌ0.  
       
        Consider profits. Using equations (6), (8), (81), P1 ൌ  P1A ൌ P1B, P2 ൌ P2A ൌ P2B, 
and b ൌγ, profits in the first period are 
                           p1 ൌ p1Aൌ  p1B ൌ  ଵ(a – bଵ+ γଵ) ൌ  ଵa                                     (86)                                                          
Using equations (6), (8), (81), P1 ൌ P1A ൌP1B, P2 ൌ P2A ൌ P2B, and b ൌγ, profits in the 
second  period are           
                             p2 ൌ p2Aൌ  p2B  ൌ ଶሺA – bP2 + γଶ+ d(a – bଵ+ γଵ))                                                                         
                                                      ൌ ଶ(A +ߜa)                                                                   (87)                                                          
Using equation (3), the total discounted profits are 
                              pAൌ  pB ൌ p1 + λp2                                                                                                           (88)                                                          
       Using (77), (81), and (86), profits in the myopic case in the first period are               
                               p1ൌ p1A ൌ p1B ൌ ଵa ൌ ߙʹߚ ൌ 50.000                                                         (89)                                                          
Using (78),(81),  and (87), profits in the myopic case in the second  period are 
                                  p2ൌ  p2A ൌ p2B ൌ ଶ(A +ߜa) ൌ  ሺܣ൅ߙߜሻʹߚ ൌ 72.000             (90) 
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Using (81), (88), (89), and (90), each firm’s total discounted profits under myopic case  
are                 
                       pA ൌ pBൌ  50.000 + 0.7(72.000) ൌ100.400                                           (91)                                                          
       Now consider the perfect-foresight case.  Using (81), (84), and (86), profits in the 
perfect foresight case in the first period are 
                        p1ൌ  p1Aൌ  p1Bൌ ߙʹെߣߙʹߜʹെߙܣߣߜߚ ൌ 41.600                                                (92)                                                          
Using (81), (85),  and (87), profits in the perfect foresight case in the second  period  
                         p2 ൌ p2A ൌ p2B  ൌ  ሺܣ൅ߜߙሻʹߚ ൌ 72.000                                                (93)                                                          
Using (81), (88), (92), and (93), each firm’s total discounted profits in the perfect 
foresight case are   
                           pA ൌ pB ൌ 41.000 + 0.7(72.000) ൌ 91.400                                            (94)                                                          
       Thus we have the following proposition 
 
Proposition 8: In this case, the total demand for the two goods is fixed, that is b ൌγ. 
The first period, and total discounted profits are higher in the myopic case than they are 
in the perfect foresight case. However, the second-period profits are the same in the 
myopic case and the perfect foresight case. 
 
3.4. Conclusions 
       This chapter shows that there is a relationship between pricing and consumer 
switching costs (or “brand loyalty”). Moreover, it suggests that in the presence of 
switching costs, firms will charge lower prices in the first period to gain market share 
that will be valuable to them in the future and therefore charge higher prices in the 
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future, utilizing the market shares they have gained in the first period.  This will give 
firms a degree of monopoly power over their existing customers, leading to higher 
prices and profits in the future.  For example, credit card issuers may choose to offer 
lower prices (card interest rates) to risky consumers – students on college campuses – 
who may be profitable to them, because these consumers have high switching costs.   
This will happen if firms have perfect foresight, and it may lead to either higher or lower 
equilibrium profits than if firms behave myopically. 
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                                                  CHAPTER 4 
                                                   METHODS 
      
                                                                                                
4.1. Data Source and Variables 
        The unique data set used in this research comes from the Center for Human 
Resource Research (CHRR) at The Ohio State University and is known as the 
Consumer Finance Monthly (CFM).  The Consumer Finance Monthly (CFM) is an on-
going national survey that asks unique questions on credit card usage that are not 
available in any major national surveys.                             
       The CFM was instituted in 2005 and has been conducted each month with a 
random sample of adult household members.  A minimum of 300 surveys are 
completed each month.  The random–digit–dialing method of sample selection is used 
to select a nationwide sample.  By the end of 2009, about 16,000 cases have been 
completed and are available for research. Compared with the Survey of Consumer 
Finances (SCF), that takes place once every three years, and sponsored by the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the CFM provides more detailed and up-
to-date data on consumer finances to reflect the most recent changes in consumer 
behavior in the credit card industry in terms of credit card usage. The CFM includes a 
variety of variables on credit card use, such as  balance switching, monthly charges, 
revolving balances, annual percentage rate, number of cards maxed out, and monthly 
payments.  The CFM also includes detailed questions on credit knowledge, credit 
stress, bill payment, demographic information, expectations about the future, household  
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debts, savings, and assets.  Moreover, besides detailed questions of household credit 
card use, the CFM includes a complete series of questions on household assets and 
liabilities that allows researchers to analyze consumers’ behavior in relation to credit 
cards in the context of their overall financial situations. 
       The variables used in the analysis can be grouped into three broad categories: 
credit card related variables, balance switching variables, and socioeconomic variables.  
Annual percentage rate (APR), amount owed on all credit cards, and borrowing limit are 
important contractual variables in the credit card section.  Balance switching section 
variables include whether or not any balances have been switched in the past 6 months, 
introductory teaser rates, balance switching fee, number of household credit cards, APR 
on the card switched away from, and APR on the card switched to.  Socioeconomic 
variables can be divided into two subgroups: demographic variables and financial 
variables.  Demographic variables include age and marital status.  Financial variables 
include homeownership. 
       The following are the credit card questions from the CFM that are used in this 
paper. 
     1. Do you have any credit cards? How many credit cards do you have. 
     2. In the past 6 months, have you switched any balances between cards or to a new 
card? 
     3. What was the old interest rate on the card you switched away from? 
     4. What was the interest rate on the card you switched to? 
     5.  If you had an unpaid balance on the card you charge the most on, what interest  
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rate would you have to pay. 
     6. Please think about the credit card on which you owe the most.  What is the 
interest rate for unpaid balances on this card? 
     7. Are there any attractive reward features on this card?      
     8. In the past 6 months, what was the lowest credit card interest rate offer you got in 
the mail? 
     9. For all your credit cards taken together, after any payments you have made or will 
make on your most recent bills, how much you still owe on them? 
    10. Is your house/ apartment in which you live is either owned or being bought? 
    11. Do you currently have Home Equity Line of Credit (HELOCs)? 
    12. What year you were born?  
    13. What is your current marital status? 
        The original sample in 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009, CFM includes 12,962 
households.  On average, 75% of the households in the U.S. population have at least 
one credit card, and among all cardholders about 40 percent have unpaid balances on 
their credit cards.  The average balance for those carrying a balance amounted to about 
$8,000.  In this study, those who have at least one credit card are considered, which will 
give us a sample of 1,101 households including only revolvers (those who do not pay in 
full each month) of whom 186 cardholders switched cards and 915 did not.   Figure 4.1 
and Figure 4.2 present detailed statistics on switchers and non-switchers in the sample. 
Detailed variables definitions and summary statistics (actual and percentage values) are 
provided in Table 4.1.  The means and standard deviations in the table are computed 
using sample weights so that the descriptive statistics are representative of the U.S 
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population.  Only households who have at least one credit card are considered in the 
calculation of the descriptive statistics. 
 
4.2.  Logit Model Specification 
        The structural method employed in this study resembles models discussed by 
Maddala (1992), Pindyck & Rubinfeld (1976), Greene (2003), and Ashenfelter et al.  
(2003 pp. 235-240).  To examine the consumer decision of whether or not to switch a 
credit card (balances), logistic regression analysis is the most appropriate type of 
examination.  The general formulation of the logit model is given by Greene (2003 pp. 
669).  The consumer’s switching decision is modeled as  ௜ܻכ ൌ ܺ௜ᇱߚ ൅ߝ௜                                                                                    (4.1)                                                          
with        ௜ܻ ൌ ͳ݂݅ ௜ܻכ ൐ Ͳ  ௜ܻ ൌ Ͳ݂݅ ௜ܻכ ൑ Ͳ 
The subscript i refers to cardholders.  ௜ܻ א ሼͲǡͳሽ denotes the absence or presence of 
switching (Yi = 1 if the consumer switches and Yi = 0 if he/she does not switch).  In this 
formulation, ܺ௜ᇱߚ is called the index function (Greene 2003 pp. 669), where ௜ܻכis a latent 
(unobserved) variable for credit card switching and the dichotomous variable ௜ܻ is the 
observed variable. The vector of covariates ܺ௜ᇱ controls for a variety of socioeconomic 
variables (financial and demographic) that may correlate with a household’s decision 
whether or not to switch a credit card.  These include age, APR, fee, balances, 
homeownership, and HELOC.  The explanatory variables can themselves be binary or 
dummy or quantitative or a mixture thereof.  This is because logistic regression makes 
no assumptions about the distribution of the independent variables.  Table 4.1 presents 
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the definitions of all variables used in this analysis. β is a vector of regression 
coefficients of the predictor variables and ߝ௜ is the error term, assumed to have a log-
Weibull (double exponential) distribution with a reverse extreme value distribution, that 
is asymmetric and has a long tail to the right,  with c.d.f: (Greene 2003, pp. 720): 
                           ܨሺɂ௜ሻ ൌ  ݁ݔ݌ି௘షഄ೔                                                                                 (4.2)                                                         
In this notation ℮ represents the base of natural logarithms which is approximated at 
2.718.  
       When using dummy variables, the dependent variable is not continuous but binary 
or dichotomous (a category variable that has two values such as “yes” and “no”).  In this 
case, the dependent variable takes the two values (1, 0).  Positive or (yes) response 
would be assigned a value of one, while a negative response would be assigned a 
value of zero.  Since a positive outcome occurs only when the latent variable exceeds 
the threshold, the logit specification of a positive outcome is of the following form ܲݎ݋ܾሾ ௜ܻ ൌ ͳሿ ൌ ௘௫௣ሺ௑೔ᇲఉሻଵା௘௫௣ሺ௑೔ᇲఉሻ ൌ ͳͳ൅݁ݔ݌െሺܺ݅′ ߚሻ                                       (4.3)                                                                                                                         ௜ܻ ൌ ൜ͳͲ  
 
Equation (4.3) represents what is known in statistics as the (cumulative) logistic 
probability distribution function.  Where Yi is the binary dependent variable indicating 
whether or not cardholder i switches a credit card. exp is the exponential function, 
sometimes written as e. When cardholder i switches balances, Yi takes the value 1; 
otherwise Yi is equal to 0. 
       If Prob[Y = 1] is the probability of switching a credit card as given by (4.3), then the  
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probability of not switching a credit card.  It is given by: 
                     ܲݎ݋ܾሾ ௜ܻ ൌ Ͳሿ ൌ ͳ െ ܲݎ݋ܾሾ ௜ܻ ൌ ͳሿ ൌ ͳ െ ௘௫௣ሺ௑೔′ ఉሻଵା௘௫௣ሺ௑೔′ ఉሻ ൌ ଵଵା௘௫௣ሺ௑೔′ ఉሻ            (4.4)              
       The general formulation of the logit model for the general case of (4.3) and (4.4) is 
given by Greene (2003 pp. 663-755).  The estimation method for the logit model is 
maximum likelihood.  The maximum likelihood function for a sample of n observations 
can be conveniently written as: 
                     LሺߚȁData) ൌ ς ൣܨ൫ܺ௜′ߚ൯൧௒೔ൣͳ െ ܨ൫ܺ௜′ߚ൯൧ଵି௒೔௡௜ୀଵ                                 (4.5)  
for Yi = 0,1.  If Yi = 0, we obtain equation (4.3), and if Yi = 1, we obtain equation (4.4). 
 
The log-likelihood function is 
      
                     ln[L(β| Xi)] ൌ ݈݊ ܮሺ ߚȁܺ௜ሻ ൌ σ ሼ୧݈݊ ܨሺܺ௜ᇱߚሻ ൅ ሺͳ െ ୧ሻ ݈݊ሾͳ െ ܨሺ ௜ܺᇱߚሻሿሽ௡௜ୀଵ  
 
                           ൌ σ ሼ௡௜ୀଵ Yi ln[ ௘௫௣ሺ௑೔ᇲఉሻଵା௘௫௣ሺ௑೔ᇲఉሻ] + (1  Yi) ln[1 െ ௘௫௣ሺ௑೔′ ఉሻଵା௘௫௣ሺ௑೔′ ఉሻሿ}                
                           ൌ  σ ሼ௡௜ୀଵ Yi ln[ ௘௫௣ሺ௑೔ᇲఉሻଵା௘௫௣ሺ௑೔ᇲఉሻ] + (1  Yi) ln[ ଵଵା௘௫௣ሺ௑೔′ ఉሻሿ}   
                           ൌ σ ሼ ௜ܻܺ௜ᇱߚ െ ݈݊ሺͳ ൅ ݁ݔ݌ሺܺ௜ᇱ ߚሻሻሽ௡௜ୀଵ                                          (4.6) 
                                                                               
       To examine the effect that a particular independent variable (Xn) has on the 
probability of switching cards, we need to calculate the marginal effect that an 
independent variable (Xn) has on the probability of switching for cardholder i.  The 
marginal effect that an independent variable (Xn) has is calculated by taking the partial 
derivative of ܲݎ݋ܾሺ ௜ܻ ൌ ͳሻ with respect to (X)n.  Hence, in the logit model we can see 
that  the estimated marginal effect of an independent variable (Xn) on the credit card 
switching  probability ܲݎ݋ܾሾ ௜ܻ ൌ ͳሿ is given as follows:      
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డ௉௥௢௕ሺ௒೔ୀଵሻడ௑೙  ൌ డி൫௑೔ᇲఉ൯డ௑೙ ߚ௡  ൌ  ௘௫௣ሺ௑೔ᇲఉሻଵା௘௫௣ሺ௑೔ᇲఉሻ[1െ ௘௫௣ሺ௑೔′ ఉሻଵା௘௫௣ሺ௑೔′ ఉሻሿߚ௡                                             ൌ ߚ௡ሾܲሺ ௜ܻ ൌ ͳሻ(1Ȃ ܲሺ ௜ܻ ൌ ͳሻ)]               (4.7)                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
 
       The derivative in (4.7) is often evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variable and 
the marginal effects are calculated for a representative cardholder with sample mean 
characteristics (the proportion of cases with the same attribute of interest in the 
sample). The result approximates the effect of the covariate near the mean of the 
response.  On the other hand, it is clear that the effect of (Xn) predictor on the probability 
of switching cards is not linear and depends on:  the coefficientߚ௡, the value of the 
probability, and the value of the independent variable (Xn).  For continuous independent 
variables, the marginal effect is the estimated effect on the probability of switching cards 
per unit change in the given independent variable. For dummy or category variables, the 
marginal effect is the estimated effect on the probability of switching cards when the 
dummy variable of interest switches from 0 to 1.   
 
4.3.   Methodology: A Simple Consumer Choice Model 
         Consider the following simple model of consumer choice.  To simplify the 
notations, I have avoided using subscripts of i, which could be added to represent 
different consumers.  There is a time period of length L. During this time period, a 
consumer earns income at the rate of M per unit of time. The consumer has a credit 
card with interest rate r0, and balances B. At the beginning of the time period of length 
62 
L, the consumer gets an offer of a credit card with interest rate r1, which is less than r0.  
Suppose that this interest rate lasts until the end of the period of length L, which is short 
enough that we don’t have to consider discounting the future, and that at the end of the 
period L, the interest rate the consumer has to pay is r0 again (whether or not the 
consumer accepted offer).  The consumer has a transactions cost (or switching cost) of 
T if and only if he/she accepts the offer. The consumer’s two choices are: do not accept 
the offer or accept the offer.  The two possible net incomes for the consumer are  
                   ܫ଴ ൌ (M – ݎ଴B)L                                                                                          (4.8)                                                                                                                  
                   ܫଵ ൌ (M – ݎଵB)L – T                                                                                    (4.9)   
where ܫ଴ is consumer’s net income if she does not accept the new offer, ܫଵ is consumer’s net income if she accepts the new offer. 
The two corresponding utility levels for the consumer are 
                    ܷ଴ ൌ β(M – ݎ଴B)L + ߝ଴     
                         ൌ βML – βݎ଴B L + ߝ଴                                                                          (4.10)                                                                                                                  
                    ଵܷ ൌ β((M – ݎଵB)L – T) + ߝଵ  
                         ൌ βML – βݎଵBL – βT + ߝଵ                                                                   (4.11)   
where ܷ଴ is consumer’s utility if she rejects the new offer,  ଵܷ is consumer’s utility if she accepts the new offer, ߝ଴ is the error term affecting utility in period 0, ߝଵ is the error term affecting utility in period 1. 
The consumer will accept the new offer if and only if ଵܷ> ܷ଴ and will reject it if ଵܷ≤ ܷ଴. 
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Y ൌ 1 means that the consumer will accept the offer. 
       Using (4.12) and (4.13), we get 
                   ܲݎ݋ܾ [Y ൌ 1] ൌ ܲݎ݋ܾ[ ଵܷ > ܷ଴]  
                           ൌ ܲݎ݋ܾ[βML – βݎଵBL – βT- βML + βݎ଴BL + ߝଵ –  ߝ଴᧺0]   
                           ൌ ܲݎ݋ܾ[–βݎଵBL – βT + βݎ଴BL + ߝଵ – ߝ଴᧺0] 
                ൌ ܲݎ݋ܾ[-β(ݎଵ – ݎ଴)BL – βT+ ߝଵ – ߝ଴᧺0] 
                 
                      ൌ ܲݎ݋ܾ[ߝଵ – ߝ଴᧺β(ݎଵ–ݎ଴)BL + βT]                                     (4.12)                                      
  
The term on the right-hand side of the inequality in the last line of (4.12) is equivalent to 
the negative of the term Xiβ’ in (4.3), except that we have not included the subscript i in 
(4.8)-(4.12).  
       Thus we have ܲݎ݋ܾሾܻ ൌ ͳሿ ൌ ͳͳ൅℮ߚሺݎͳܤܮെݎͲܤܮ൅ܶሻ                                        (4.13)                                                           
Y = 0 means that the consumer will reject the new offer.  Therefore,        
   ܲݎ݋ܾሾܻ ൌ Ͳሿ ൌ ͳ െ ܲݎ݋ܾሾܻ ൌ ͳሿ ൌ ͳ െ ͳͳ൅̼ߚሺݎͳܤܮെݎͲܤܮ൅ܶሻ            (4.14)                                        
The odds ratio in favor of switching a credit card, that is the ratio of the probability that 
cardholder i will switch her credit card to its complement (the probability of not switching  
cards) is  
                    
௉௥௢௕ሾ௒ୀଵሿଵି௉௥௢௕ሾ௒ୀଵሿ ൌ భభశ̼ഁሺೝభಳಽషೝబಳಽశ೅ሻଵି భభశ̼ഁሺೝభಳಽషೝబಳಽశ೅ሻ ൌ  ଵ̼ഁሺೝభಳಽషೝబಳಽశ೅ሻ   (4.15)               
Taking logarithms and calculating the logit or log-odds, we gain the log of the odds ratio,  
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that is called the logistic transformation, or logit for short 
                       Logit (Y) = ln(odds) ൌ ሺ ௉௥௢௕ሾ௒೔ୀଵሿଵି௉௥௢௕ሾ௒೔ୀଵሿሻ 
                                                       ൌ ሺ ଵ̼ഁሺೝభಳಽషೝబಳಽశ೅ሻሻ                       
                                                       ൌ െߚሺݎଵܤܮ െ ݎ଴ܤܮ ൅ ܶሻǡ                                    (4.16)                                
where ln is the natural log function.  The marginal effect of switching costs on the 
probability of switching is calculated by taking the partial derivative of the probability of 
switching with respect to T.  The estimated marginal effect of switching cost on the 
probability of switching is given by 
                        
డ௉௥௢௕ሾ௒ୀଵሿడ் ൌ ିఉ̼ഁሺೝభಳಽషೝబಳಽశ೅ሻሺଵା̼ഁሺೝభಳಽషೝబಳಽశ೅ሻሻమ ൏ Ͳ                                          (4.17)                                                    
 
Proposition 1:  The likelihood of switching cards decreases with increasing switching 
costs.                                                                                                                                         
       
       The marginal effect of the old interest rate (the interest rate on the current card) on 
the probability of switching is calculated by taking the partial derivative of the probability 
with respect to ݎ଴.  The estimated marginal effect of ݎ଴ on the probability of switching is 
given by 
                       
డ௉௥௢௕ሾ௒ୀଵሿడ௥బ ൌ ఉ஻௅̼ഁሺೝభಳಽషೝబಳಽశ೅ሻሺଵା̼ഁሺೝభಳಽషೝబಳಽశ೅ሻሻమ ൐ Ͳ                                         (4.18)             
Proposition 2: The likelihood of switching cards (balances) increases with an 
increasing current interest rate. 
  
      The marginal effect of new interest rate (the introductory or teaser rate on the new 
card) on the probability of switching is calculated by taking the partial derivative of the 
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probability of switching with respect to r1.  The estimated marginal effect of the new  rate 
on the probability of switching is given by                    
                 
డ௉௥௢௕ሾ௒ୀଵሿడ௥భ ൌ ିఉ஻௅̼ഁሺೝభಳಽషೝబಳಽశ೅ሻሺଵା̼ഁሺೝభಳಽషೝబಳಽశ೅ሻሻమ ൏ Ͳ                                          (4.19)             
 
Proposition 3: The likelihood of switching cards (balances) decreases with an 
increasing new interest rate. 
   
       The marginal effect of credit card debt (balances) on the probability of switching is 
calculated by taking the partial derivative of the probability of switching with respect to 
B.   The estimated marginal effect of credit card balances on the probability of switching, 
assuming that the interest rate on the credit card that is switched to is less than the 
interest rate on the credit card that switched away from is given by  
                      
డ௉௥௢௕ሾ௒ୀଵሿడ஻ ൌ ିఉሺ௥భ௅ି௥బ௅ା்ሻ̼ഁሺೝభಳಽషೝబಳಽశ೅ሻሺଵା̼ഁሺೝభಳಽషೝబಳಽశ೅ሻሻమ ൐ Ͳ                     (4.20)             
 
Proposition 4: Assuming that r0 ൐ r1, then the likelihood of switching cards increases 
with increasing credit card outstanding balances. 
        
       The marginal effect of the introductory rate duration (length of time) on the 
probability of switching is calculated by taking the partial derivative of the probability of 
switching with respect to L.  The estimated marginal effect of L on the probability of 
switching, assuming that r1 < r0, is given by 
                     
డ௉௥௢௕ሾ௒ୀଵሿడ௅ ൌ ିఉሺ௥భ஻ି௥బ஻ା்ሻ̼ഁሺೝభಳಽషೝబಳಽశ೅ሻሺଵା̼ഁሺೝభಳಽషೝబಳಽశ೅ሻሻమ ൐ Ͳ                     (4.21)             
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Proposition 5: The likelihood of switching balances increases with an increasing 
introductory rate time period. 
         
4.4. The Econometric Model 
4.4.1. Model Specification 
       Based on consumer choice theory, the individual decision for credit card switching, 
CCSi, among cardholders can be specified as: 
                                              CCSi = ƒ(Pi,Mi,Gi,Ei)                                                     (4.22)                                                                       
where Pi is the price of credit as measured by annual percentage rate (APR); Mi is a 
vector of socioeconomic (demographic and financial) variables; Gi is a vector of credit 
card related variables; and Ei is a vector of dummy variables. 
       To control for socioeconomic (demographic and financial) individuals’ differences, 
the vector of explanatory variables under Mi includes age, marital status, and 
homeownership.     
       Analyzing consumer behavior in the credit card market by tracking changing 
consumer switching behavior among consumers who revolve balances (do not pay 
balances in full each month) allows us to look at consumer behavior from broader 
prospective. Figure 4.3 compares the mean reduction in the new Annual Percentage 
rate (APR1) switchers and non-switchers. Figure 4.4 compares the percentage 
reduction of the new Annual Percentage Rate (APR1) for switchers and non-switchers. 
Figure 4.5 shows that large number of non-switchers received offers with lower rates 
than what they already had but they did not switch, because these rates are introductory 
and associated with high switching fees. On the other hand, understanding the 
determinants of consumer ability to switch balances from cards that have high interest 
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rates to the ones with low introductory interest rates will allow us to understand how 
consumers maximize their utilities by switching balances.          
 
4.4.2. The Econometric Model       
       On the basis of the theoretical considerations, the following two regression 
equations are run, logit models will be estimated using  logistic regression models for 
estimating the probability of a cardholder’s credit card (balances) switching: 
Model 1:  ଵܻ௜כ ൌ Ⱦ଴ ൅ Ⱦଵሺ଴ሻ୧ ൅ Ⱦଶሺଵሻ୧ ൅ Ⱦଷሺሻ୧ ൅ Ⱦସሺሻ୧ ൅ Ⱦହሺሻሻ୧ ൅ Ⱦ଺ሺ
ሻ୧ 
          ൅Ⱦ଻ሺሻ୧ ൅ Ⱦ଼ሺሻ୧ ൅ ࣟ୧                                                                              (4.23)                                          
and 
Model 2:  ଶܻ௜כ ൌ Ⱦ଴ ൅ Ⱦଵሺ	ሻ୧ ൅ Ⱦଶሺሻ୧൅Ⱦଷሺ
ሻ୧ ൅ Ⱦସሺሻ୧ ൅ Ⱦହሺሻ୧ ൅ ࣟ୧       (4.24)                                                                                
whereYi = 1 if a consumer switches and Yi = 0 if the consumer does not switch.   β1, β2, 
β3, β4, β5, β6, β7, and β8 are unknown parameters to be estimated.  Finally, ɂ୧ is the error 
term.  Switching benefits in equation (4.24) is obtained according to the following 
formula: (r0 – r1)BL for each observation in the sample.  where r0 is the old interest rate ( 
APR0), r1 is the new offer interest rate (APR1), B is the outstanding balances, and L is 
the duration of the new offer introductory rate (APR1).  Maximum likelihood estimation is 
used to estimate the above proposed econometric models.  The logit model is based on 
the cumulative logistic probability of switching as explained by the explanatory variables  
included in the proposed econometric models and defined in Table 4.1 below.  Table 
4.1 presents the definitions of all explanatory variables used in this study. Means and 
standard deviations for the financial, socioeconic and demographic variables used in 
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this study for the total sample are presented in table 4.2 below.  Table 4.3 compares the 
sample characteristics of switchers and non-switchers. 
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Variables Type Definition of Variables 
Yi Binary 1 – If switched 
0 – Otherwise 
APR0
5 
Continuous Interest rate on card switched from 
 
APR1 
 
Continuous 
 
Interest rate on card switched to 
 
Intro Rate Period 
 
Continuous 
 
Number of months APR1 is an introductory rate 
 
Balance 
 
Continuous 
 
Balances of all credit cards 
 
NCC  
 
Continuous Number of household credit cards 
 
Age 
 
Continuous 
 
Age of respondent 
 
Marital Status 
 
Binary 
 
 
1 – If married 
0 – Otherwise 
 
Home Ownership 
 
Binary 
 
 
 
1 – If owns a home 
0 – Otherwise 
Benefits of Switching Continuous 
 
Amount Saved By Switching  according to the formula: 
[(APR0  -  APR1) × Balance × Intro Rate Period] 
Table 4.1: Definition of Variables 
5
 Note: APR0 and APR1 for those who did not switch was determined by the interest rate on the card on which they 
owe the most and the lowest rate the consumer was offered through the mail. 
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Variables Sample Mean Sample Standard Deviation 
Yi 0.17 0.26 
 
APR0 
12.75 6.23 
 
APR1 
 
3.67 
 
5.57 
 
Intro Rate Period 
 
9.03 
 
9.62 
 
Balance 
 
7606.13 
 
10775.92 
 
NCC  
 
3.40 2.28 
 
Age 
 
48.55 
 
15.60 
 
Marital Status 
 
0.68 
 
 
0.49 
 
 
HomeOwnership 
 
Switching Benefits ($)6 
 
0.83 
 
604.37 
 
 
0.41 
 
 
 
 
1348.09 
 
Table 4.2: General Sample Characterstics (N = 1,101) 
6
Note: Amount Saved By Switching  according to the formula: [(APR0 - APR1) ×Balance×Intro Rate Period] 
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Variables 
Sample mean Sample Standard Deviation 
Non-Switchers 
(n=915) 
Switchers 
(n=186) 
Non-
Switchers 
(n=915) 
Switchers 
(n=186) 
yi 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
APR0 12.14 15.75 7.32 6.77 
APR1 3.88 2.65 5.31 4.27 
Intro Rate Period 9.50 6.76 9.43 10.20 
Balance 6,535.84 12,871.24 9,420.75 14,779.49 
NCC 
Age 
3.23 
48.76 
4.23 
47.51 
2.24 
12.31 
2.60 
11.88 
Marital Status 0.67 0.68 0.46 0.47 
Home Ownership 0.82 0.90 0.39 0.30 
Benefits of Switching  
(in Dollars Saved) 
 
434.75 
 
1438.81 
 
1125.20 
 
1925.76 
Table 4.3:  Sample Characterstics of  Switchers and Non-Switchers (N = 1,101)  
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Figure 4.1: Comparisons between Switchers’ Data and Non-Switchers’ Data 
 
 
Figure: 4.2:  Comparison of Percentages between Switchers and Non-Switchers  
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Figure 4.3: Comparison between APR Switchers and APR Non-Switchers 
 
Figure 4.4: Comparison of Percent Change in APR between Switchers and Non-Switchers 
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Figure: 4.5: Comparison between Non-Switchers with Lower Rates in the Mail and Non-Switchers with Higher Rates in the Mail 
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                                                            CHAPTER  5 
                                          EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
5.1. Model 1 Determinants of Credit Card Switching 
        Table 5.1 presents the results of the model 1 (equation 4.23) logit estimation for 
credit card switching. Besides the parameters coefficients and standard errors, marginal 
effects around the mean are also reported to reflect the estimated changes in the 
probability of switching.  The marginal effects are calculated for a representative 
household with sample mean characteristics. These regression results support the 
general conclusion that consumers’ balances switching is systematically related to the 
explanatory variables.  Moreover, they show variables that seem to explain what 
influences consumer behavior toward switching.  Among these variables are: old 
interest rate, new interest rate, duration of the introductory rate, balances, number of 
credit cards (NCC), homeownership, and age.  At the conventional 5 percent standard 
level for statistical significance, the following coefficients have significance: old interest 
rate, new interest rate, duration of the introductory rate, balances, number of credit 
cards, homeownership, and age. 
       One of the key variables of the study, interest rate, is a significant determinant of 
credit-card switching.  When shopping for credit cards in the market, revolvers usually 
prefer offers with lower interest rates, although convenience users are not as sensitive 
to the interest rate as revolvers (Canner and Luckette, 1992).   
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       Not surprisingly, the old interest rate is positively and significantly related to the 
likelihood of switching and the marginal effect is about 1.03 percent points with every 
one unit increase in the old interest rate..    
       In recent years, card issuers have made widespread of “teaser” rates, soliciting 
cardholders to switch banks.  These teaser rates are simply much lower than the 
prevailing rate for the first year or so, encouraging cardholders to switch balances to the 
lower interest rates.  After the introductory rate offer period ends, card issuers will 
increase the rate to prime plus a dozen. The new interest rate is negatively and 
significantly associated with the likelihood of switching because the interest rate is the 
price of borrowing and it is more expensive to borrow on credit cards with higher interest 
rates.    Holding other variables constant at sample mean levels, one unit increase in 
the new interest rate (APR1) will decrease the likelihood of switching by 0.97 percentage 
points for a representative household. Hence, my empirical results support and  the 
following theoretical predictions: 
பሺଢ଼ୀଵሻப୰బ ൐ Ͳ பሺଢ଼ୀଵሻப୰భ ൏ Ͳ (see propositions 2 and 3 in 
chapter 4).  Curiously enough, this empirical finding is inconsistent with Ausubel’s 
(1991) finding that cardholders act myopically and do not foresee indebtedness and 
interest payments on their outstanding balances.  
       The duration of new introductory offer rates is positively related to the likelihood of 
switching and the marginal effect is 0.23 percentage points with each additional one 
month (period) increase in the duration of a new introductory rate offer the 
representative household is offered, which means that I have empirical support for the 
following prediction: 
பሺଢ଼ୀଵሻப୐ ൐ Ͳ(see proposition 5 in chapter 4).   
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       Multiple credit cards increase the available funds for borrowing and therefore the 
likelihood of switching.  Holding multiple credit cards by a consumer may be an 
indication of this consumer’s willingness to take on a high debt which may be 
manifested in higher balances held.  The logit model shows that number of credit cards 
is significantly and positively related to the likelihood of switching and the marginal 
effect is 0.94 percentage points with one additional credit card the representative 
household has.  Switchers tend to hold more credit cards because they can save money 
by transferring balances from credit cards with higher interest rates to those with lower 
interest rates.  This makes sense because the more credit cards a consumer has the 
more freedom he/she has to switch balances between existing cards, consistent with 
Cargill and Wendel’s (1996) finding that people obtain more cards to allow for larger 
balances.   
       Compared with transactors, revolvers tend to have more credit cards as well as 
more balances.  Therefore, revolvers have more incentives to search for lower rates.  
This is consistent with Cook’s (2002) finding that that credit card holders with high 
balances do not seem to search less than those with lower balances.  Moreover, 
economic theory indicates that credit card balances should fall as the APR increases. 
However, Min and Kim (2003) found that for households, interest rates had no 
significant effect on the amount of borrowing, only on the borrowing decision.   The 
empirical regression results obtained in this study fit the theory fairly well.  The higher 
the balances of a representative household, the higher the probability of switching.  
Hence, credit card balances have the expected positive and significant effect on the 
likelihood of switching.  For a household with sample mean characteristics, each 
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additional $100 increase in balances will increase the probability of switching by 
0.04473 percentage points. Thus, I have empirical support for the following prediction: డሺ௒ୀଵሻడ஻ ൐ Ͳ (see proposition 4 in chapter 4).   
       Among demographic variables, age is significantly and negatively associated with 
the decision of switching and with each additional year of age the probability of 
switching cards goes down by 0.19 percentage points.  The negative coefficient on age 
is consistent with Calem and Mester’s (1995) and Min and Kim’s (2003) findings that 
credit card balances are negatively related to age. They argue that older households 
are less likely to use credit cards for borrowing than younger households and the more 
elderly an applicant is, the greater the physical difficulty of searching for lower interest 
rates is.  Also, some elderly consumers may prefer the traditional payment methods to 
credit cards, consistent with the premise that age reflects on the amount of desired 
credit, borrowing needs tend to be relatively lower in the earlier and late stages of the 
lificycle.    Hence, older households search and switch less than younger households. 
       Homeownership is significantly and positively associated with the decision of 
switching a credit card, the estimated difference in the probability of credit card 
switching is 9.79 percentage points for a homeowner representative household.  
Homeownership may influence credit card borrowing through home equity lines of credit 
(HELOC).7 HELOCs provide another finance instrument for consumers who are 
homeowners tend to borrow less on their credit cards than renters.  They have the 
option of borrowing from HELOCS instead from credit card, and they also can choose to  
_______________________ 
 
 
7Home Equity Line of Credit 
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pay down their credit card debt using HELOCs.  Since renters do not have such an 
option, this might be the reason why they switch balances and borrow more on their 
credit cards than homeowners.   
       Marital status (MS) was not found to be significantly associated with the decision of  
switching balances. The probability of switching a credit card is less for married 
consumers. According to the marginal effect the probability of switching cards for a 
married household is 3.44 percentage points less than for non-married household. 
5.2. Testing Whether or not Model 1 β1 and β2 Are Equal or Equal to the Opposite 
       Table 5.2 presents the analysis of testing the hypotheses whether or not the 
coefficients on the old interest rates and the new interest rates are equal in magnitude 
but opposite in sign.  I failed to reject the hypothesis that β1 = – β2, that is β1 and β2 (the 
coefficients on APR1 and APR2) are opposite in sign.   However, I rejected the 
hypothesis that β1 = β2, that is β1 and β2 (the coefficients on APR1 and APR2) are equal 
in magnitude and have the same sign. 
5.3. Model 2 Determinants of Credit Card Switching 
      Table 5.3 presents the results of the model 2 (equation 4.24) logit estimation for 
credit-card switching. Besides the parameters coefficients and standard errors, marginal 
effects around the mean are also reported to reflect the estimated changes in the 
probability of switching.  At the conventional 5 percent level for statistical significance, 
the following coefficients have significance: benefit from switching, number of credit 
cards (NCC) held, age, and homeownership.  As expected, the switching benefit 
variable has the greatest influence on why consumers switch credit cards. 
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      Switching benefit is positively and significantly related to the likelihood of switching. 
Holding other variables constant at sample mean levels, each additional unit increase in  
switching benefits will increase the likelihood of switching by 0.0060 percentage points 
for a representative household.  At sample mean levels, a typical cardholder’s expected 
benefits from switching is $604.37 over the entire introductory rate period.   
       The number of credit cards in logit model 2 shows that the number of credit cards is 
significantly and positively related to the likelihood of switching in logit model 2 and the 
marginal effect is 1.13 percentage points with one additional credit card the 
representative household has.                 
       Age is significantly and negatively related to the decision of switching and with each 
additional year of age the probability of switching cards goes down by 0.18 percentage 
points.  Homeownership is significantly and positively associated with the decision of 
switching a credit card, the estimated difference in the probability of credit card 
switching is 8.96 percentage points for a homeowner representative household.   
       Marital status (MS) was not found to be significantly associated with the decision of 
switching balances. The probability of switching a credit card is less for married 
consumers. According to the marginal effect the probability of switching cards for a 
married household is 3.18 percentage points less than for non-married household.  
5.4.  Measuring the Goodness of Fit of the Logit regression Model 
       The logit regression output yields many new statistics because the estimation 
methodology is different from multiple regression.   The first statistic is measure of the 
overall fit. The log-likelihood test, analgous to the global F-test where the null 
hypothesis says that some of the βs are equal to zero.  The absolute values: (880.480) 
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and (907.678) in models 1 and 2 respectively have no interpretation; the statistics 
shows that model 1 with the eight  explanatory variables is significantly better than the 
the model with the (base or null) that lacks these variables.  Similarly, the statistics 
shows that model 2 with the four  explanatory variables is significantly better than the 
the model with the (base or null) that lacks these variables. 
      Another way to test the goodness of fit of a logit regression model is to use Hosmer 
and Lemeshow test.  The Hosmer and Lemeshow test is a measure of overall model fit, 
comparing the observed and predicted values.  Hosmer and Lemeshow, also called the 
chi-square  test, has an insignificant Chi-square value for the presented model, yielding 
a p-value of 0.0865 and 13.824 Chi-Square value for model 1 (equation 4.23) thus 
suggesting a model with a (fairly) good predictive value and indicating a good model fit.  
Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between 
observed and model predicted values, implying that the model’s estimates fit the data at 
an acceptable level. 
 
5.5. J-Tests for Model Selection Results 
            Tables 5.4 and 5.5 report the empirical results of the J-Tests for models 1 and 2.      
Among many approaches which have been formulated for model selection is the J-test 
of Davidson and MacKinnon (1981).  J-test is most commonly used to test non-nested 
hypotheses.  This test is used in this paper and is proceeded as follows: (1) models 1 
and 2 were estimated, deriving the fitted values (expected values for models 1and 2) of 
Ŷi1 andŶi2; (2) the variable Ŷi1 was added as an independent variable to model 2 and the 
new model was re-estimated to test the hypothesis that the coefficient on Ŷi1 is equal to 
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zero using a t-test.  I failed to reject the hypothesis in question; and (3) the variable Ŷi2 
was added to model 1 and the new model was re-estimated to test the hypothesis that 
the coefficient on ŶI2 is equal to zero.  The hypothesis was not rejected. Both models 1 
and 2 are accepted models.  I failed to reject the hypotheses that the coefficients on the 
fitted values of Ŷi2 and Ŷi1 are equal to zero.  Adding the fitted values for Ŷi1 to model 2 
had no explanatory power over and above the variables in model 2.  Similarly, adding 
the fitted value of Ŷi2 to model 1 had no additional explanation over and above the 
variables in model 1. Therefore, neither model is rejected and both models are 
accepted. 
5.6. Why Do Not Consumers Switch Their Credit Cards? 
       The credit card industry is an industry where both search and switching costs are 
likely to be present.   Switching costs are incurred by buyers for terminating transaction 
relationships and initiating a new relation.  Calem and Mester (1995) show that 
consumers carry balances on their cards with fairly high interest rates, despite receiving 
offers from cards with fairly low interest rates.  They argue that the reason behind doing 
so is that consumers with high balances have difficulty switching cards.  They also 
argue that search and switching costs result in adverse selection in the credit card 
market.  Specifically, if a bank unilaterally lowers its interest rate, it will mainly attract 
cardholders who search switch most for lower interest rates.  Cardholders with large 
balances who yield high profits would be less able to transfer their balances to a new 
card issuer due to asymmetric information between card issuers in the credit card 
market.  This difficulty in switching balances by those cardholders who carry high 
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balances may be an indicator of switching and search costs existence in the credit card 
industry. 
      Stango (2002) argues that consumers are becoming more insensitive to Interest 
rate selection because they feel they will never get a better rate.  Consumer level data 
shows that consumers receive offers with teaser rates to switch credit cards, move 
balances from one card to another.  However, they are reluctant to do so. One reason 
could be the existence of switching costs in the credit card markets. Because these 
costs are intangible, they are hard to observe and measure.  My empirical data shows 
that 95 percent (915 cardholders) of those who did not switch balances received offers 
with significantly lower rates than what they already had but refused to switch (see 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2).   The reason for this consumer reluctance to switch is that these 
offers were introductory offer rates, lasting for very short periods of time.  For 
economists, this apparent reluctance to switch credit card balances appears to be 
irrational behavior.   However, in the credit market, switching a credit card is not always 
costless.  Consumers are aware that they are likely to incur certain costs when 
switching suppliers.  Some of these costs might have to do with switching costs (costs 
of switching a supplier).  The major switching cost is the transaction cost.  There are 
some one-time inconveniences and efforts incurred each time a consumer switches 
from one card to another.  Consumers also face information costs of searching for and 
switching to a new credit card supplier and setting up a new relationship, which may be 
a time-consuming process.  There are also artificial or contractual costs that are present 
because of special programs and discounts credit card issuing firms offer their 
cardholders.  Specifically, consumers may build up frequent-fliers miles on their cards, 
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have their utility bills automatically charged, or enjoy the familiarity of having the same 
account for a long time.  Because consumers have different motives for holding credit 
cards, they have different incentives to incur certain costs of searching for lower interest 
rate terms (Kim, Dunn, and Mumy, 2005).   It is not unusual for some consumers to 
maintain a loyalty toward a product they have been using for a long time. Brand loyalty 
increases consumers’ commitment toward a product, making consumer willingness to 
switch weaker. 
       Ausubel (1991) and Stango (2002) argue that some credit card fees, such as the 
card annual fee, may prevent consumers from switching cards as it becomes costly for  
customers to switch or to carry more than one card. Consumers’ ignorance and 
underestimation of their borrowing potentials, leading them to accumulate huge 
amounts of debt, may also contribute to their inability to find better rates and so to 
switch cards.  These added costs for switching may explain why consumers do not 
switch cards when they are offered to do so, which contributes to the failure of 
competition in this industry as theorized by Ausubel (1991).    
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Variables Coefficient Standard Error Marginal Effect 
Intercept** -3.0440 0.4895 N/A 
APR0
*** 8.4147 0.0127 1.0339 
APR1
*** -7.9180 0.0204 -0.9729 
Intro Time Period*** 0.0193 0.00844 0.2375 
Balance*** 0.000036 7.24E-6 0.0004473 
 NCC** 0.0769 0.0355 0.9453 
Age** -0.0158 0.00736 -0.1937 
Marital Status -0.2803 0.1894 -3.4447 
Home Ownership*** 0.7973 0.2792 9.7964 
Table 5.1: Model 1 Logit Estimates for Credit Card Switching (N = 1101) 
Note: Marginal effects are in terms of percentage points      
***Significant at 1% level of better;  
**Significant at 5% level or better;  
*Significant at 10% level or better. 
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The Logistic Procedure 
Linear Hypotheses Testing Results 
 
Label             Wald Chi-Square           DF        Pr > Chi-Square 
                    Test 1                 0.0570                        1                   0.8113 
                    Test 2                 36.8752                      1                  < .0001 
Table 5.2: Testing Whether or not the Coefficients on APR1 and APR2 are Equal                                
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Variables Coefficient Standard Error Marginal Effect 
Intercept** -2.2077 0.4314 N/A 
Benefits of Switching*** 0.000483 0.000070 0.006089 
NCC*** 0.0903 0.0339 1.1378 
Age** -0.0145 0.00723 -0.1821 
Marital Status -0.2525 0.1856 -3.1818 
Home Ownership*** 0.7115 0.2771 8.9667 
Table 5.3: Model 2 Logit Estimates for Credit Card Switching (N = 1101) 
Note: Marginal effects are in terms of percentage points      
***Significant at 1% level of better;   
**Significant at 5% level or better;  
*Significant at 10% level or better. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88 
Variables Coefficient Standard Error Pr > Chisq 
Intercept** -3.1001 0.4933 < .0001 
APR0
*** 8.8474 1.3329 < .0001 
APR1
*** -8.1569 2.0596 < .0001 
Intro Time Period*** 0.0193 0.00852 <.0001 
Balance*** 0.000041 8.296E-6 < .0001 
 NCC** 0.0828 0.0358 0.0207 
Age** -0.0167 0.00742 0.0247 
Marital Status -0.2978 0.1900 0.1171 
Home Ownership** 
Ŷi2_Expected
  
0.8144 
-0.5341 
0.2799 
0.4918 
0.0036 
0.2774 
Table 5.4.: Model 1 (J-Test) Logit Estimates for Credit Card Switching (N = 1101) 
Note: Marginal effects are in terms of percentage points      
***Significant at 1% level of better;  
**Significant at 5% level or better;  
*Significant at 10% level or better. 
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Variables Coefficient Standard Error Pr > Chisq 
Intercept** -2.0388 0.4292 < .0001 
Benefits of Switching*** 0.00563 0.000929 < .0001 
NCC*** 0.0982 0.0350 0.0051 
Age** -0.0155 0.00727 0.0337 
Marital Status -0.2948 0.1872 0.1153 
Home Ownership** 
Ŷi1_Expected
  
0.7338 
-0.7180 
0.2719 
0.5041 
0.0070 
0.1544 
Table 5.5: Model 2 (J-Test) Logit Estimates for Credit Card Switching (N = 1101) 
Note: Marginal effects are in terms of percentage points      
***Significant at 1% level of better;   
**Significant at 5% level or better;  
*Significant at 10% level or better. 
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                                                            CHAPTER 6 
    CONCLUDING REMARKS AND SUMMARY 
                   
       This chapter provides a summary of the main issues, key findings of the study, and 
discusses the links between the research and the key findings in this analysis.  It also 
provides the implications of the study and presents some suggestions for future 
research.   
       The introduction of the credit card in the mid-twentieth century revolutionized and 
transformed how people live.  According to the CFM, the percentage of credit card 
ownership averaged 75% of the population over the last 5 years. With the increase in 
credit card borrowing and competition among credit card issuers, the consumer 
behavior in this market is becoming more complex.  This research is an attempt to 
model the changing behavior of credit card switching among consumers who revolve 
balances. 
       The unique CFM data used in this study provides the most up-to-date information 
on the consumers’ recent behavioral changes in the credit card industry that is not 
available in any other public consumer finance data set.  Based on a set of new survey 
data, this dissertation empirically investigates consumer behavior in the credit card 
industry. 
       Analyzing consumer behavior in the credit card market helps to provide an 
understanding of how consumers maximize utilities by switching balances, and allows  
us to look at consumer behavior in the credit card market from broader prospective.          
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       I have theoretically identified the crucial factors that determine whether or not a 
consumer is likely to switch cards.  Specifically, this research represents an effort of 
modeling credit card switching of consumers using an econometric model that is 
anchored on the economic theory of consumer behavior that incorporates demographic, 
economic and socioeconomic considerations into the decision making process.  It has 
empirically investigated consumer credit card usage and switching. The variables which 
I have examined have captured some key behaviors which have not been studied 
previously and hopefully shed new light on overall consumer behavior in the credit card 
market.  Using data from the Consumer Finance Monthly (CFM) of The Ohio State 
University, I find that at the conventional 5 percent level of significance, the following 
variables have significance:  old interest rate, new interest rate, duration of the 
introductory rate, balances, number of credit cards, homeownership, and age.  As 
expected, interest rates, balance, the duration of new introductory rate, and 
homeownership have the greatest influence on why or why not people switch credit 
cards in model 1(equation 4.23).  Switching benefit, number of credit cards, and 
homeownership have the greatest influence on why or why not people switch credit 
cards in model 2 (equation 4.24).   
       Another key result is that the interest rates on existing balances significantly and 
positively influence credit-card switching of the U.S. households. This finding is 
consistent with the view that consumers make rational decisions in the credit card 
market, since balance-carrying consumers are sensitive to the terms of credit card 
contracts, such as the interest rate on existing balances, the new rate, and the duration 
of the new rate.  It also implies that switching and search costs are important  economic 
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factors in this market, challenging Ausubel’s (1991) argument of credit card consumer 
irrationality and Calem and Mester’s (1995) empirical finding that credit card rates are 
sticky because consumers are irresponsive to rate cuts.  I have also found that the 
longer the duration of the introductory rate, the higher the probability of switching.        
       The empirical data used in this study tends to support that consumers usually 
receive new offers to switch cards with significantly lower rate than what they already 
have, however they reject to switch. One of the main reasons for this consumer 
irresponsiveness or reluctance to switch credit-card balances is that these offers are 
introductory, lasting for only a short period of time.  Due to costs associated with the 
consumer decision of switching credit card suppliers, consumers may become reluctant 
to switch, suggesting that switching costs outweigh switching benefits. 
       I have indicated earlier in this paper (in chapter 4) that switching a credit card is not 
always costless.  Consumers are aware that they are likely to incur certain costs when 
switching suppliers.  Some of these costs might have to do with switching costs (costs 
of switching a supplier).   There are some one-time inconveniences and efforts incurred 
each time a consumer switches from one card to another.  Switching credit card 
balances may be a time-consuming process. There are also artificial or contractual 
costs that are present because of special programs or discounts offered by credit 
issuers.   However,   due to a lack of information of relevant variables such as switching 
fees and annual fees, these variables were not incorporated in the presented models. 
However, this does not diminish the results of my research.    
       Research in the economic literature on credit card markets is relatively new.  This 
dissertation adds to this young literature, but there is much more to be explored and 
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learned. For example, the payment behavior of consumers in the credit card market 
could be analyzed and explored.  Some consumers use their credit cards as extension 
to liquidity and roll over balances, incurring unnecessary costs even though they are not 
liquidity constrained.  Some may choose to pay exactly the minimum required payment 
and some pay more than the minimum, and others pay balances in full.  It will be very 
useful to model these behaviors.         
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       The introduction of the credit card in the mid-twentieth century revolutionized and 
transformed how people live.  Based on a set of new survey data, this dissertation 
empirically investigates and analyzes consumers’ behavior in the credit card market.  
Specifically, it investigates the underlying determinants of consumers’ choices regarding 
switching credit-card balances.  To estimate the likelihood that consumers switch credit 
cards, two logit models are estimated.  Using data from the Consumer Finance Monthly 
(CFM) of The Ohio State University, the author finds that at the conventional 5 percent 
level of significance, the following variables have significance:  old interest rate, new 
interest rate, duration of the introductory rate, balances, number of credit cards, 
homeownership, and age.  As expected, interest rates, balances, the duration of new 
introductory offer rates, and homeownership have the greatest influence on why or why 
not people switch credit cards. The findings are consistent with the view that consumers 
make rational decisions in the credit card market, since balance-carrying consumers are 
sensitive to the terms of credit card contracts, such as the interest rate on existing 
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balances, the new rate, and the duration of the new rate.   It also implies that switching 
costs are important, challenging Ausubel’s argument of credit card consumer 
irrationality and Calem and Mester’s empirical finding that credit card rates are sticky 
because consumers are unresponsive to rate cuts. 
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